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ABSTRACT
American legal scholars spend a large proportion of their time
debating and theorizing procedure. This Article focuses on American
proceduralism in the particular field of civil justice and undertakes a
detailed comparison with England, where procedural questions receive
little academic attention. It finds that procedure is more prominent in
America partly because Americans have been more willing than others to
use private litigation as a tool for regulation. More significantly,
procedural questions necessarily occupy more space in American debates
because authority over civil justice is unusually dispersed among different
actors; procedural rules allocate power among these actors. But American
proceduralism runs deeper than these surface explanations allow, and a
full account requires an examination of the history of American legal
thought. I trace contemporary American proceduralism to a counterintuitive source—the emergence of Legal Realism in the 1920s and 1930s.
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INTRODUCTION

In law, procedure matters. From the very start of law school,
students learn that many of the most important questions about
law and justice are procedural. In first-year civil procedure
courses, students consider questions such as: which court has the
power to hear the plaintiff’s claim? What does a plaintiff have to
plead to survive a motion to dismiss? Will a jury or judge decide
the case? Criminal law courses often include a large criminal
procedure component; regardless, everyone knows how important
procedural issues are in criminal justice. American law students
quickly understand, if they don’t know already, that procedural
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rules are often just as important as the substantive law governing
the plaintiff’s claim or the prosecution’s case.
Procedural questions are important in any legal system, but
they often dominate legal debates in the United States to a
puzzling extent. As Robert Kagan says, “[c]ompared to other
economically advanced democracies, American civil life is more
deeply pervaded by conflict and by controversy about legal
processes.”1 Regardless of the content of their views on procedure,
Americans consider procedural issues to be centrally important. In
the depth of their absorption with procedural questions, American
lawyers and legal scholars appear to diverge from many of their
foreign counterparts. The aim of this Article is to figure out why.
Post-9/11 litigation by alleged enemy combatants detained in
Guantanamo and elsewhere provides a vivid example of
proceduralism in action. The plaintiffs in these cases asserted
dramatic violations of their substantive rights to be free from
illegal detention and torture. The central questions raised by waron-terror litigation surely concern the factual and legal validity of
these claims. But, writing more than six years after the September
11, 2001 attacks, Jenny Martinez demonstrated that most of the U.S.
court decisions in detainee litigation were fixated on questions of
process: whether the federal courts had the power to hear the
dispute, which federal district was the proper venue, whether the
correct branch of the federal government had taken the necessary
decision, whether particular plaintiffs had standing, whether
evidence was protected from discovery by the state secrets
privilege, and so on.2 (Not much has changed since then.3)
1 ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 3
(2001).
2 See Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War On Terror,” 108
COLUM. L. REV. 1013 (2008).
3 The Supreme Court has continued to focus on procedural issues in war-onterror cases since Martinez’s article. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court,
Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on Law and Political Science, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 352, 391 (2010) (examining the “noteworthy disparity” between the
Supreme Court’s “assertiveness in upholding judicial jurisdiction” and “its
reticence regarding substantive rights”); Stephen I. Vladeck, The Passive-Aggressive
Virtues, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 122, 125 (2011) (“Although the Justices have
repeatedly acted to assert and preserve the institutional role of the federal courts
more generally, they have been decidedly unwilling to engage the substance of
counterterrorism policies, especially in cases in which those policies relate to
alleged abuses of individual civil liberties.”).
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Martinez contrasted the greater propensity of British4 and Israeli
courts to reach the merits in war-on-terror cases and suggested that
“there is something particular about American legal culture at this
moment in time” that provides at least part of the explanation for
that concentration on procedural issues.5
This “something particular” about American legal culture is the
focus of this Article. I aim to make two main contributions to the
limited literature on the distinctively proceduralist tilt of American
legal education and scholarship.6 First, I establish and explain this
form of American exceptionalism in the particular field of civil
justice.7 In America, civil procedure is at the core of the first-year
curriculum and plays host to a wide array of sophisticated
scholarly approaches; American scholars intellectualize legal
procedure to an unusual degree. Here, as elsewhere in the Article,
I sharpen our understanding of America by comparing it to its
close cousin: England.8 In marked contrast to the American
position, few scholars in England focus their work on civil
procedure, and most students pass through their law degrees
4 For more on the British judicial response, see John Ip, The Supreme Court and
House of Lords in the War on Terror, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 1 (2011) (considering the
implications for individual liberties of decisions by the United States Supreme
Court and the United Kingdom’s House of Lords in war-on-terror litigation).
5 Martinez, supra note 2, at 1016; see also id. at 1078 (“[J]urists in many other
nations simply do not share the American academic fascination with process and
skepticism of rights-based arguments.”).
6 Aside from Martinez, supra note 2, surprisingly few scholars have written
generally on the reasons for the proceduralist bent of American legal culture. As
discussed in Section 3.2, infra, previous work on Anglo-American comparative
civil procedure by Benjamin Kaplan and Masayuki Tamaruya has noticed that
procedural questions seem to inspire more debate in American civil justice than in
its English equivalent. See Benjamin Kaplan, An American Lawyer in the Queen’s
Courts: Impressions of English Civil Procedure, 69 MICH. L. REV. 821, 844 (1971)
(noting that “strife” over reforms of court procedure was “far less intense in
England than in the United States”); Masayuki Tamaruya, The Anglo-American
Perspective on Freezing Injunctions, 29 CIV. JUST. Q. 350, 363 (2010) (noting that
“politics does not appear to play a significant role” in English civil procedure,
whereas American civil procedure is “overtly political”).
7 By “civil justice,” I mean simply civil litigation (in public law and private
law). See Jason M. Solomon, What Is Civil Justice?, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 321–24
(2010) (distinguishing among different uses of the phrase “civil justice” in
academic and popular discourse).
8 Martinez conjectures that the legal systems of other nations are less
proceduralist than the United States, but says that a comparative study of the
relationship between substantive and procedural law is beyond the scope of her
article. See Martinez, supra note 2, at 1078.
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without giving it much thought. Proceduralism in civil justice,
therefore, is not synonomous with the common-law tradition.
Given their shared substantive and procedural heritage, the
divergence between England and the United States is remarkable,
and cries out for explanation.
Second, I provide a two-level account of the origins and
circumstances of contemporary American proceduralism. At one
level, I tie the high degree of salience that procedural questions
have in American civil justice to distinctive features of civil
litigation: Americans simply do more with civil litigation, and
authority over civil justice is divided among varied actors. More
fundamentally, I contend that American proceduralism is closely
related to the history of American legal thought, in general, and to
the rise of Legal Realism, in particular. The more obvious place to
seek the origins of American proceduralism is the Legal Process
movement that flourished in the 1940s and 1950s.9 But we gain a
deeper understanding of the character of American proceduralism
by looking back further, to the Legal Realists. I show that, as part
of their embrace of an instrumental approach to legal justification,
and their skepticism about the determinacy of substantive law, the
Realists themselves called attention to the significance of procedure.
Their work then provoked a proceduralist response in the shape of
Legal Process thought. Through the intellectual descendants of the
Realists and Legal Process theorists, the strongly proceduralist
element in American legal thought lives on today.
The Article proceeds as follows. I begin in Section 2 with some
analytical work, explaining precisely what I mean by
proceduralism. In so doing, I canvass much of the existing
scholarship on the substance-procedure relationship. In Section 3,
I survey contemporary legal education and scholarship and show
the centrality of procedure to American legal culture in the field of
civil justice, contrasting it with English legal culture. In Section 4, I
explore a partial explanation for the difference: American lawyers
consider procedure more consequential in civil justice because
procedure simply is more consequential in American civil justice. I
give two sets of reasons. First, procedure is more important in
9 See Martinez, supra note 2, at 1064 (“Despite years of criticism of the
limitations and shortcomings of Legal Process methodology, there is enduring
(and not entirely unwarranted) appeal in the promise that if we can just figure out
a good process for making decisions, the hard policy questions of the time will be
resolved correctly.”).
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American civil justice because Americans place more faith in civil
litigation, relying on private parties as agents of regulation, where
other legal systems choose a government-led solution or leave the
social problem to market or social pressure.10 So the stakes in
American civil justice are higher than elsewhere, and the peculiarly
American reliance on litigation has spawned procedural
innovations like class actions and large punitive damages. These
developments give American procedure scholars more to write
about and American students more to learn. Second, adjudicative
power over civil justice in America is distinctively fragmented
among different actors—between federal courts and state courts
and between judge and jury.11 Procedural law is so significant in
America partly because it polices the boundaries between these
various actors. I support these contentions by again focusing on
the American-English contrast. In England, power over civil
justice is reposed mainly in a single, relatively homogeneous, set of
judges. The English legal system’s essentially unitary character
and the near-extinction of its civil jury are crucial factors in the
continued dominance of substance over procedure in England.
While these distinguishing features of American civil justice are
a vital part of the story, I believe they do not alone explain the full
extent of American proceduralism.
Accordingly, Section 5
explores deeper reasons, reasons that lie in the history of legal
thought. Looking to the intellectual history of American law, I find
the roots of contemporary proceduralism in the emergence of
Legal Realism in the 1920s and 1930s. The Legal Realists fomented
skepticism about substantive law, gaining near-universal
acceptance for Llewellyn’s dictum that “law in the books” (in
essence, substantive law) often differs fundamentally from “law in
action” (affected by procedure). The more one sees law as a means
of achieving economic or political goals, as American lawyers and
legal theorists typically do, the more important procedure becomes
in assessing the law’s actual contribution to those goals. The
Realists did not just talk about procedure (though they certainly
did that); one of their number, Charles E. Clark, was the principal
architect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the
response of Legal Process theorists to the Realist attack on the
See Section 4.1, infra.
See Section 4.2, infra (discussing the fragmentation of power in the civil
justice system).
10
11
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coherence of substantive law was to seek agreement on procedural
solutions, thus assuring the special significance of procedure in the
way Americans think about law. An understanding of the
importance of procedure is now almost unanimous among
American lawyers.
Again, I reinforce my argument by focusing on the English
comparison. At the end of the nineteenth century, AngloAmerican lawyers shared a belief in the primacy of substantive
law. The English, however, retained this belief, while procedure
grew in importance for the American legal academy. Unlike the
United States, England never had a Realist revolution, and the
English still place less weight on procedural questions in civil
justice. This, I suggest, is no coincidence. My comparative law
case for the connection between Realism and proceduralism is
strengthened by analysis of a 1932 article by a leading Realist,
Thurman Arnold.12 As Arnold and his colleagues attacked
previous understandings of the substance-procedure distinction,
Arnold looked across the Atlantic to find that substantive law
retained its privileged position.
Arnold was describing a
transatlantic divergence that remains eighty years later.
In short, the Article links two intuitions that commonly strike
people who, like me, have come to the American legal system from
another: (i) that American legal culture is deeply affected by Legal
Realism, and (ii) that Americans are exceptionally interested in
procedure. The argument is not a simplistic one that Legal Realism
“caused” American proceduralism; I suggest the possibility of
mutual causation between these two crucial aspects of American
legal life.
2.

PROCEDURALISM

Legal scholars frequently use the word “proceduralism,” and
the corresponding word “proceduralist.”13
Proceduralism,
whatever it may be, has received plenty of attention in criminal

12 See Thurman Arnold, The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal
Process, 45 HARV. L. REV. 617, 643 (1932).
13 The word “proceduralist” is used mainly as a noun (usually to denote a
person who espouses proceduralism), but also sometimes as an adjective (to
describe an institution or argument that partakes of proceduralism).
“Proceduralistic” also makes an occasional appearance in the law reviews.
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law,14 constitutional theory,15 the legislative process,16 political
philosophy,17 legal theory,18 bankruptcy law,19 corporate law,20
14 As I discuss further in note 60, infra, Bill Stuntz provides a detailed
description and critique of proceduralism in criminal justice. See WILLIAM J.
STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 196–242 (2011); William J.
Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 781
(2006) (arguing that “constitutional proceduralism” during the 1960s and 1970s
backfired and led to a harsher criminal justice system); William J. Stuntz,
Substance, Procedure, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 1
(1996) (examining the intersection of two lines in constitutional law: “the line that
separates criminal from civil, and the line between substance and process”);
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 74–76 (1997) (arguing for a doctrine-by-doctrine
examination of the law of criminal procedure to determine whether the costs of
procedures are worthwhile). For further criticisms of “proceduralism” in criminal
law, see Developments in the Law: The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1114,
1158–63 (2008) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s “proceduralism” in cases
involving mental capacity determinations); Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing
Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case Of Alford and
Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1363 (2003) (challenging “the
proceduralist approach to criminal procedure”).
15 Most theoretical attempts to justify the American practice of judicial review
of legislation may be characterized as proceduralist. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980) (providing a
“representation-reinforcing” account by leading exemplar John Hart Ely, which
has been described by both critics and allies as involving proceduralism); see also
Michael C. Dorf, The Coherentism of Democracy and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1237,
1268 (2005) (stating that Ely “espouses proceduralism” and “goes so far as to
suggest that it is in the very nature of a constitution to create a procedural
framework rather than to resolve substantive issues”); Lawrence H. Tribe, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064
(1980) (criticizing Ely on the ground that “[t]he process theme by itself determines
almost nothing unless its presuppositions are specified, and its content
supplemented, by a full theory of substantive rights and values”). Cf. Frank I.
Michelman, The Not So Puzzling Persistence of the Futile Search: Tribe on
Proceduralism in Constitutional Theory, 42 TULSA L. REV. 891, 891 (2007) (describing
the “proceduralistic turn” in liberal thought about how to justify judicial review
of legislative action).
16 See Jeremy Waldron, Principles of Legislation, in THE LEAST EXAMINED
BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 15, 31 (Richard
W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) (defending scholarship that focuses on the
rules governing the legislative process against charges of “mindless
proceduralism”).
17 For example, the work of John Rawls has been characterized as
“proceduralist,” partly because of Rawls’s assertion that the subject-matter for a
theory of justice is the basic structure of society, and partly because Rawls uses
the procedural device of agreement behind a veil of ignorance as a justificatory
strategy. See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999). See also Michelman, supra note 15, at 102; cf.
Joshua Cohen, Pluralism and Proceduralism, 69 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 589, 616–18 (1994)
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administrative law,21 employment law,22 the law of public
schools,23 and election law.24 Whether they simply identify
proceduralism, consider themselves proceduralists, or diagnose
proceduralism as a malady, scholars rarely attempt to define these
terms.
Clarifying, or at least stipulating, the meaning of
(examining the relationship between procedure and substance in political
philosophy and arguing that Rawls has a substantive conception of justice).
18 Debates over the concept of “rule of law” often center on the contrast
between proceduralist views and substantive views.
See, e.g., Daniel B.
Rodriguez, Mathew D. McCubbins & Barry R. Weingast, The Rule of Law
Unplugged, 59 EMORY L.J. 1455, 1469–71 (2010) (contrasting the “substantive”
conceptions of the rule of law held by Hayek, Rawls, and Dworkin with Raz’s
“proceduralist” account).
19 See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573,
576–77 (1998) (dividing bankruptcy law scholars into “traditionalists” and
“proceduralists”); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy Law:
Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 931 (2004)
(defending “proceduralism” as an account of U.S. bankruptcy law).
20 Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for Shareholder
Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163, 172 (1997)
(arguing that procedural protections for shareholders against director self-interest
are inadequate).
21 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist
Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1341 (2006) (referring to the
“proceduralism that dominates post-APA legal thinking in administrative law”);
David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT.
REV. 201, 230 (criticizing the “simple promotion of proceduralism” by the U.S.
Supreme Court in United States v. Mead); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY
233 (1992) (contending that “[t]he APA is a prominent example of the dialectical
relationship between expertise theory and proceduralism” and that “[a] declining
faith in the ability of experts” led to “a re-emergence of proceduralism.”).
22 See Paul M. Secunda, Labor and Employment Law, 64 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
203, 204 (2010) (reviewing CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM
SELF-REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION (2010)) (defining as “proceduralist” an
“approach that emphasizes the existence of procedural devices to mitigate
employer unfairness in the workplace” and describing Estlund’s argument as
proceduralist).
23 See Jon Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends: Structural Due Process in
Special Education Law, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415 (2011) (examining proceduralism
in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); David L. Kirp, Proceduralism
and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting, 28 STAN. L. REV. 841 (1976)
(considering the power and pitfalls of procedural protections as a means of
curbing arbitrary behavior by public school officials).
24 See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Electoral Dispute Resolution: The Need for a New
Sub-Specialty, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281, 286 (2012) (proposing a new
scholarly field named “Democratic Proceduralism” that “ambitiously attempts to
develop new and better procedures for operating a democratic society”).
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proceduralism is a crucial preliminary step in my argument that
proceduralism is a defining feature of American civil justice. I ask
first: what is procedure? Then, I ask: what kind of orientation
towards procedure counts as proceduralism?
2.1. Procedure and Substantive Law
American lawyers are “brought up on sophisticated talk about
the fluidity of the line between substance and procedure.”25 Yet
there is rough agreement on what counts as procedure and what
counts as substantive law, however poorly theorized that
agreement may be.26 While it may be difficult to tell whether a
particular rule is procedural or substantive, the existence of
troublesome borderline cases does not make the distinction
meaningless. Mostly, the difference is intuitively obvious. In
criminal law, for example, the definition of an offense is a matter of
substantive law. In the tort of negligence, the elements of the
plaintiff’s cause of action—duty, breach, causation, and damage—
are matters of substantive law. But the rule that the prosecution
must prove the elements of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable
doubt is a rule of procedure, and so is the (general) civil rule that
the plaintiff must establish the elements of a cause of action by a
preponderance of the evidence. Rules about the proper forum for
litigation are procedural, and so are rules about jury selection.
Also procedural are the rules about the kinds of evidence the
parties may offer to the court.
A procedure is a way of doing something. In law, procedure is
a way of “doing” substantive law.27 Substantive law is the body of
25 John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724
(1974). See also Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 192
(2004) (describing the procedure-substance distinction as “a tough nut to crack”).
A recent remark by Joseph Blocher is representative of the prevailing academic
attitude toward the procedure-substance distinction. Blocher employs the terms
“substantive” and “procedural,” while “knowing that the distinction between
substantive and procedural rights is blurry at best.” Joseph Blocher, Rights To and
Not To, 100 CAL. L. REV. 761, 765 n.20 (2012).
26 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1733, 1735–36 (1995) (“Participants in legal controversies try to produce
incompletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes. They agree on the
result and on relatively narrow or low-level explanations for it. They need not
agree on fundamental principle. They do not offer larger or more abstract
explanations than are necessary to decide the case.”) (citations omitted).
27 See Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH.
U. L. REV. 801, 810 (2010) (“[S]ubstance and procedure . . . are not only counter-
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rules that purports to guide people’s conduct outside litigation and
the lawmaking process.28 In litigation, we need answers to two
questions: what is the law that governs the parties’ relations outside
of litigation? And how do courts resolve disputes about what that
law means for the parties in particular cases? Substantive law is an
answer to the “what” question; procedure is an answer to the
“how” question. This “what-how” distinction tallies with the
difference in constitutional law between “procedural due process”
and “substantive due process.”29 Substantive due process30—an
oxymoron, perhaps31—prevents government actors from depriving
persons of certain interests, no matter how they do it. Procedural
due process doctrine regulates only how government may deprive
a person of life, liberty, or property. Similarly, in administrative
law, when exercising “procedural review,” a court may review how
the agency reached its decision; review of the merits of the decision
itself is “substantive review.”32

terms or antonyms, but are also paradoxically yoked: each is extraordinarily
difficult to define without also defining the other.”) (citations omitted).
28 This view of substantive law reflects Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474–77 (1965). For similar views, see Martinez, supra note
2, at 1020–21; Solum, supra note 25, at 192–225; Thomas W. Merrill, The Common
Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46 n.200 (1985). See also S.A.
Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 310 (7th Cir. 1995)
(Posner, J.) (the aim of a legal rule is “substantive” when it is “designed to shape
conduct outside the courtroom and not just improve the accuracy or lower the
cost of the judicial process”).
29 See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause,
120 YALE L.J. 408, 417–19 (2011) (“[T]he distinction between adjudication-related
conduct and non-adjudication-related conduct is sufficiently distinct to serve as a
useful dividing line for distinguishing between substantive and procedural
rights.”) (citation omitted).
30 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (“The Due Process
Clause guarantees more than fair process . . . .”).
31 See Mays v. City of East St. Louis, 123 F.3d 999, 1001 (7th Cir. 1997)
(Easterbrook, J.) (remarking that “‘substantive due process’ is an oxymoron”).
Critics of substantive due process delight in pointing out the difficulties of
squaring this body of doctrine with the text of the Clauses. See, e.g., John
Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 493
(1997) (likening a “reader of the Supreme Court’s substantive due process cases”
to a “moviegoer who arrived late and missed a crucial bit of exposition”); ELY,
supra note 15, at 18 (“[W]e apparently need periodic reminding that ‘substantive
due process’ is a contradiction in terms—sort of like ‘green, pastel redness.’”).
32 Mark Seidenfeld, Substituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance
Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331 (2012).
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Much of the agony over the substance-procedure distinction
flows from the Erie case.33 The Erie doctrine is not only “the most
studied principle in American law,”34 but also the central platform
for discussing the procedure/substance distinction.35 Before Erie,
when federal district courts exercising their diversity-of-citizenship
jurisdiction adjudicated a common-law cause of action, such as a
claim in contract or tort, they usually applied their own brand of
common law, “federal common law.”36 But after Erie, “there is no
general federal common law” because, as the Supreme Court
decided, the federal courts lack constitutional authority to declare

33 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The literature on Erie and
subsequent cases is enormous and inconclusive. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, The
Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 987 (2011); Robert J.
Condlin, “A Formstone of Our Federalism”: The Erie/Hanna Doctrine & Casebook Law
Reform, 59 U. MIAMI L. REV. 475, 525 (2005); Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George
Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules: An Essay on What’s Wrong with the Recent
Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707 (2006); Ely, supra note 25; Henry J. Friendly, In
Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964);
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
489 (1954); Jennifer S. Hendricks, In Defense of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy,
89 WASH. U. L. REV. 103 (2011); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work:
Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its ErieHanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963 (1998); Solum, supra note 25, at
192–225; Adam N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does it Mean for
the Contemporary Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245 (2008);
Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and Erie, 64 VAND. L. REV 877 (2011).
34 Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of
Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 312 (1980) (attesting to the importance of the Erie
doctrine as the keystone to American civil procedure).
35 As Lawrence Solum says, “[a]ny discussion of substance and procedure
that does not start with Erie will nonetheless be interpreted by American judges,
lawyers, and legal academics with Erie’s legacy in mind. In a sense, the question
‘What is procedure?’ begins with Erie—whether we like it or not.” Solum, supra
note 25, at 193.
36 See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842). The decision in Swift rested on the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, which provides that
“[t]he laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or
statutes of the United States otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as
rules of decision in trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in
cases where they apply.” In Swift, the court adopted a restrictive interpretation of
the “laws of the several states” that included statutory law and “local” common
law, but excluded “general” state common law. In Erie, the Supreme Court
interpreted “laws of the several States” to include general state common law,
citing “the work of a competent scholar” as to the original intent behind in the
Rules of Decision Act. Erie, 304 U.S. at 73 n.5 (citing Charles Warren, New Light on
the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L .REV. 49 (1923)).
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substantive rules of common law.37 By the same token, no one
doubted federal authority to develop rules of procedure for the
federal courts to apply in diversity actions.38 Indeed, four years
before the Court’s Erie decision, Congress had passed the Rules
Enabling Act, asserting federal power to promulgate for the federal
courts “rules of practice and procedure.”39 In a nutshell, the
conventional understanding of Erie is that “federal courts sitting in
diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural
law.”40
In Erie itself, Justice Reed foresaw future problems, pointing
out that “[t]he line between procedural and substantive law is
hazy.”41 Sure enough, a series of Supreme Court decisions has
followed, and the Court has sometimes struggled to apply the
Is a state statute of limitations
distinction consistently.42
37 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (stating that the Constitution does not confer on federal
courts the power to make substantive federal law).
38 In Erie, Justice Reed stated in concurrence that “no one doubts federal
power over procedure.” Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring).
39 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a). The grant of rule-making authority further helped to
enshrine the procedure-substance distinction by providing that the Federal Rules
could “not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” Id. § 2072(b). For
the history behind the Rules Enabling Act, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
40 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996) (explaining
Erie’s reading of the Rules of Decision Act). For a challenge to this conventional
understanding, see Steinman, supra note 33 (arguing that the Erie doctrine
requires federal courts to follow state law on many procedural issues, including
summary judgment and class certification, because the application of federal
procedural rules would interfere unduly with substantive state-law rights).
41 Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring) (surmising that it may be difficult
to differentiate between substantive and procedural law as the majority opinion
posits).
42 See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431
(2010) (holding that a New York law prohibiting class actions for a certain cause
of action did not preclude a federal court sitting in diversity from hearing a class
action under Federal Rule 23); Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S.
497 (2001) (holding that the claim-preclusive effect of a decision by a federal
district court sitting in diversity is governed by the laws of the state where the
deciding court is located); Gasperini, 518 U.S. 415 (allowing New York’s more
invasive standard for judicial review of jury awards to apply in a federal court
sitting in diversity); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (ruling that federal
courts should apply the federal rule regarding service of process); Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (holding that federal courts sitting in
diversity should follow federal practice of having the issue of eligibility for
workers’ compensation determined by a jury, despite state law rule favoring
judicial determination); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (allowing
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procedural or substantive?
(Answer: perhaps surprisingly,
substantive.)43 Is a rule providing a valid method of service of
process procedural or substantive? (Answer: procedural.)44 In the
most recent Erie doctrine case, Shady Grove, Justice Scalia used
quotations from previous cases to reiterate the Court’s
longstanding definition of procedure.45 Procedure, he wrote, is
“the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress
for disregard or infraction of them.”46 “If [a procedural rule]
governs only ‘the manner and the means’ by which the litigants’
rights are ‘enforced,’ it is valid; if it alters ‘the rules of decision by
which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights,’ it is not.”47
As well as court procedure, lawyers and scholars must attend
to law-making procedure. How is (and should) law-making power
(be) allocated among different branches of government, and
between the federal government and state government? Some
procedural questions straddle the law-making/adjudication
boundary. Procedural questions include general questions of legal
method: questions about the methodology for interpreting statutes,
questions about whether and when to follow or disregard
precedent, and questions about how much power courts should
have to review the decisions of administrative agencies. These,
too, are procedural questions for the purposes of my description of
proceduralism.

federal court to apply federal rules if the outcome would be substantially the
same as applying state rules).
43 See Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 110, 112 (holding that state statute of
limitations applies since applying the corresponding federal rule would
substantially alter the outcome of the case).
44 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 463–64, 473–74 (enforcing the federal rule regarding
service of process as a procedural rule).
45 See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14
(1941); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464; Burlington Northern R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8
(1987); Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946)).
46 Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (quoting Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14) (internal
quotations omitted).
47 Id. (quoting Murphree, 326 U.S. at 446). Cf. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109
(“[Procedure is] the manner and the means by which a [substantive-law] right to
recover, as recognized by the State, is enforced.”).
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2.2. Proceduralism as Belief in the Centrality of Procedural Questions
Now that we know what procedure is, what is
proceduralism?48 As I define it, proceduralism is simply the
tendency to believe that procedure is centrally important.49
Arguments premised on the importance of procedure are
proceduralist (or proceduralistic); people who generally tend to
believe procedure is important are proceduralists. We can also
diagnose proceduralism on a larger scale: participants in and
observers of a proceduralist legal culture allocate relatively larger
proportions of their interests, energies, and attentions to questions
of procedure rather than to questions of substantive law.
My definition is purposefully broad, and, though usage has
been far from consistent, my version at least has the advantage of
covering most things that have been called “proceduralism” or
“proceduralist” in the legal literature.50 First, it includes someone
who thinks that only procedure matters. In the context of legal
debates, it is hard to find anyone who really believes that only
procedure matters. Legal writers do sometimes use this narrow
definition of proceduralism either as an ideal-type51 or to caricature
48 On the varieties of meanings of words ending in “-ist” and “-ism”, see, for
example, Adrienne Lehrer, A Note on the Semantics of -Ist and -Ism, 63 AM. SPEECH
181 (1988) (noting the emergence of “racism,”“ageism,” and “speciesism”);
Michael R. Dressman, The Suffix -Ist, 60 AM. SPEECH 238 (1985) (discussing the
divergence of and differences between -ist, -ism, and -ize); cf. MORRISSEY, You
Know I Couldn’t Last, on YOU ARE THE QUARRY (ATTACK Records 2004) (“[E]very
-ist and every -ism thrown my way to stay.”).
49 See Damien Geradin, The Development of European Regulatory Agencies: What
the EU Should Learn From American Experience, 11 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 1, 47 (2004)
(cautioning against “‘proceduralism,’ whereby a disproportionate amount of time
and energy is devoted to procedural issues”).
Geradin’s definition of
proceduralism is similar to mine except that he adds a pejorative connotation.
50 My definition, however, does not seem to fit Edward Janger’s theory of
“Universal Proceduralism” for resolving choice-of-law questions in cross-border
insolvency law. See Edward J. Janger, Universal Proceduralism, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
819 (2007) (proposing universal but minimally harmonized rules of transnational
bankruptcy procedure, and non-uniform substantive law). Cf. Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, A Comment on Universal Proceduralism, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 503
(2010) (criticizing Janger’s theory of universal proceduralism).
51 See Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
312, 321 (1997) (defining “proceduralism” as the kind of justificatory theory of
democracy that is “indifferent to the substantive decisions produced by a
particular governmental arrangement, caring only that, according to some
particular substantive moral theory, the procedures used to produce those
decisions either are inherently good or promote good effects”).
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the arguments of opponents.52 The definition also includes a more
commonly held view about procedure: “the notion that good
procedures are presumptive evidence of good results.”53 Third,
my definition includes those who believe that more formal
procedures (for example, a formal notice-and-comment procedure
before administrative rule-making) will lead to better outcomes.54
Finally, it also includes the family of views that stresses the
intrinsic value of procedures as opposed to, or in addition to, their
instrumental effects.55 Note, however, that within my definition,
one need not subscribe to any particular theory to be a
proceduralist. Procedure may matter to a proceduralist because of
its instrumental effects, or because procedure is valuable in its own
right.
Moreover, to be a proceduralist, one need not adhere to any
particular beliefs about what counts as a good or a fair procedure.
My argument that American legal culture is particularly
proceduralist, therefore, is distinct from Robert Kagan’s critique of
American overreliance on “adversarial legalism”—the excessive
use of costly and adversarial legal processes—to implement social

52 See David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions:
Cost Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 19 n.2 and accompanying text
(describing as “myopic” the proceduralist approach “that ignores deterrence and
compensation objectives and related individual welfare effects of the substantive
law in evaluating the operation and potential redesign of the civil liability
system”).
53 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Metaprocedure, 98 YALE L.J. 945, 964 (1989)
(reviewing ROBERT M. COVER, OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK, PROCEDURE (1988)).
See also Cass R. Sunstein, In Memoriam, Bernard D. Meltzer (1914–2007), 74 U. CHI.
L. REV. 443, 444 (2007) (noting “Bernie was a craftsman because he was a
proceduralist—one who believed, with Justice Frankfurter, that ‘the history of
liberty has largely been the history of the observance of procedural safeguards’”).
54 This appears to be the meaning of “proceduralism” criticized in Barron &
Kagan, supra note 21, at 229–32.
55 See Solum, supra note 25, at 183 (“While procedural justice is concerned
with the benefits of accuracy and the costs of adjudication, it is not solely
concerned with those costs and benefits. Rather, procedural justice is deeply
entwined with the old and powerful idea that a process that guarantees rights of
meaningful participation is an essential prerequisite for the legitimate authority of
action-guiding legal norms.”); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process
Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 49–52 (1976) (exploring individual
dignity as a value when evaluating procedures).
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policies.56 According to my definition, Kagan himself is a
proceduralist because he stresses the importance of examining and
reforming the particular procedural solutions that Americans have
chosen. Regardless of the sources of their proceduralism, or their
own views about what counts as good procedure, proceduralists
stand out for their belief that procedure is at least as important as
matters of “substance.”57 Where proceduralist ideas prevail,
procedural questions have a higher degree of salience.58
3.

AMERICAN PROCEDURALISM IN CIVIL JUSTICE

My focus in this Article is on proceduralism in civil justice.59 It
is not that proceduralism is especially pronounced in civil justice;
in fact, proceduralism is perhaps a more widely accepted feature in

56 As I explain in Section 4.1, infra, however, there is surely a link between the
American focus on procedural questions and the particular procedural solutions
American legal institutions have chosen.
57 In this way, my analysis of proceduralism is structurally similar to a
comparative-law analytic distinction drawn by James Whitman between
“consumerism” and “producerism.” See James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus
Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law, 117 YALE L.J. 340 (2007). Whitman’s
purpose is to undertake a comparative-law analysis of the supposed
encroachment of American consumerism in continental Europe; along the way, he
contrasts consumerism with its opposite, producerism. The point, according to
Whitman, is not that American law simply favors consumers, or that European
law simply favors producers. Rather, the point is that Americans tend to consider
the debate between competing perceptions of consumer interest to be important,
while Europeans tend to lend greater importance to questions about producers’
interests. On Whitman’s exposition, what is distinctive about a consumerist legal
order is that participants see the rights and interests on the demand side of the
market as significant. A producerist legal order focuses on the supply side, with
the rights and interests of different classes of producer—workers vs. employers,
small businesses vs. large businesses, and so forth—dominating debates.
58 On the concept of salience, see Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The Court’s
Agenda—And the Nation’s, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18
n.40 (2006) (describing salience as “weighty prominence” and distinguishing it
from “mere importance, mere knowledge, or even mere prominence”).
59 For an attempt to approach civil and criminal procedure from a single
perspective, see Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural
Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79, 85–86 (2008) (“There are (almost) no general
proceduralists, only criminal proceduralists and civil proceduralists who, like the
blind men in John Godfrey Saxe’s The Blind Men and the Elephant, ‘see’ only part of
the picture.”). I will mostly leave the specific field of administrative law to one
side. But there, perhaps more than anywhere else, proceduralism reigns. See
Mashaw, supra note 21; Barron & Kagan, supra note 21; HORWITZ, supra note 21.
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the criminal field.60 My first aim, then, is to establish the
significance of procedure in the intellectual life of American civil
justice. I reinforce the point by contrasting the peripheral position
that procedure plays in the academic legal education and
scholarship in England.
60 As Bill Stuntz has shown, the Warren Court attempted to rein in the
excesses of police and prosecutors mainly by conferring new procedural rights on
defendants, rather than by regulating the substantive law of crimes. See generally
Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, supra note 14. See also STUNTZ,
THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 14, at 216–242 Stuntz
argued that this focus on criminal procedure backfired, partly because the
Supreme Court essentially left legislatures a free hand as they expanded the scope
of substantive criminal law. On Stuntz’s account, “[t]he Supreme Court decided
to regulate policing and procedure, and the politicians responded with a fortyyear backlash of overcriminalization and overpunishment.” Stuntz, The Political
Constitution of Criminal Justice, supra note 14, at 849–50. Whether or not Stuntz is
right to consider this procedural strategy an error, it is plain that the Warren
Court largely disregarded substantive criminal law and looked for procedural
solutions. Justice Stevens finds Stuntz’s critique of “Earl Warren’s errors”
“surprisingly unpersuasive,” but accepts the premise of “our system’s focus upon
criminal procedure rather than substance.” John Paul Stevens, Our ‘Broken
System’ of Criminal Justice, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, November 10, 2011 (reviewing
STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 14).
In response to Warren Court reforms, law-and-order forces in the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts and in the Congress fought procedure with procedure,
making it more difficult to assert procedural rights by erecting more and more
procedural barriers to post-conviction relief in the federal courts.
See
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub L. No 10432, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.)
[parenthetical according to rule 12.2.2, p. 113]. The result of the AEDPA and
judicially created procedural obstacles to federal-court review of state-court
convictions is that “[f]ederal judges expend enormous amounts of time reviewing
habeas petitions from state prisoners, but much of that time is spent finding ways
to dismiss the petitions on procedural grounds without ever addressing their
merits.” Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 1–2 (2010); see also Larry Yackle, State Convicts and Federal Courts: Reopening
the Habeas Corpus Debate, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 541, 542 (2006) (“The failure of
federal habeas to help correct problems in state criminal justice systems is
particularly regrettable given evidence that states systematically violate criminal
defendants’ rights.”). Cf. Jordan Steiker, Innocence and Federal Habeas, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 303, 320–69 (1993) (noting the Supreme Court’s evasion of jurisdictional
barriers to habeas review in pursuit of equitable results). Both conservative and
pro-defendant voices decry excessive proceduralism in American criminal justice.
See Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal Constitutional
Claims Raised By State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of Excessive Proceduralism,
1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 315, 315–17 (noting that the law-and-order
“overproceduralism” critique laments the overprotection of criminal defendants
and the devolution of criminal trials into procedural morass, while defense
lawyers and civil rights activists lament the numerous procedural bars to postconviction relief).
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3.1. The Centrality of Procedure in American Civil Justice
The obvious place to start is civil procedure. Civil procedure is
at the heart of American legal curriculum. By “civil procedure,” of
course, I mean the rules and principles governing how a legal
system enforces the rights and duties created by substantive law:
in which court an action may be brought, the standards for
pleading and summary judgment, the scope of pre-trial discovery,
the allocation of responsibility for lawyers’ fees, and so on. In the
first-year curriculum, these procedural questions stand on a similar
footing to questions of substantive law. This insight may seem
either surprising or obvious to American readers, but I hope to
establish that it is both true and significant.
American law schools aspire to be professional schools, so it is
unsurprising that the rules governing litigation appear somewhere
on the curriculum. However, students don’t just learn civil
procedure as preparation for the bar exam. Rather, it is an integral
component of the standard first-year curriculum. Every American
law student takes civil procedure, and the professors who teach the
subject engage in vigorous scholarly debates and discuss a steady
stream of major Supreme Court decisions.61
The cultural
prominence of civil procedure is impressed on the American law
student from day one.62 Law students are taught to approach
procedural questions not simply as technical rules they need to
learn if they are to argue about substantive questions. Rather,
procedural questions are themselves the site of intellectually
challenging arguments about justice, rights, efficiency, and
sovereignty. This is true even in more doctrinally focused civil
procedure courses that focus on the Federal Rules.
Often, American civil procedure courses begin with the topic of
personal jurisdiction. What might otherwise seem a technical issue
becomes, in the hands of any reasonably competent American law
professor, a vehicle for exploring questions of state sovereignty,
61 Cf. Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure
Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313, 314–15 (2012) (welcoming the Supreme Court’s recent
re-engagement with civil procedure, and noting that the Court has decided more
than twenty civil procedure cases in the last six terms).
62 See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Structuring Complexity, Disciplining Reality: The
Challenge of Teaching Civil Procedure in a Time of Change, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1191,
1191 (1993) (“[S]tudents find procedure enormously complex and challenging,
and it has the reputation for being the hardest course in the first-year
curriculum.”).
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individual fairness, and legal method. Students become familiar
with the formalistic territorial approach exemplified by Pennoyer v.
Neff,63 the “minimum contacts” revolution of International Shoe
Company v. Washington,64 and the more recent reassertion of formal
reasoning in cases like Burnham v. Superior Court of California.65 The
Supreme Court produced two major fresh personal jurisdiction
decisions in 2011.66 Immediately, the American student sees civil
procedure as vital—worthy of strident debate by Supreme Court
Justices67—rather than as a dry set of rules subservient to
substantive law.
Another important topic for the first-year law student is
pleading: what must the plaintiff include in the complaint to
survive a pre-answer motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim?
Again, this might sound at first like a minor question, but in
America it raises basic questions about citizens’ rights of access to
the courts. Formally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require
only “notice pleading,” but two recent Supreme Court decisions
hold that, in fairness to defendants, plaintiffs ought to put more
flesh on the bones of their complaints.68 A federal-court plaintiff is
now required to state a claim for relief that is facially plausible,69 a

95 U.S. 714 (1877).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
65 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
66 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011); Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
67 The Supreme Court has issued several fractured and sharply divided
rulings in cases concerning personal jurisdiction over a non-forum defendant
whose goods cause harm after being taken to the forum jurisdiction. See McIntyre,
131 S. Ct. at 2786–91 (plurality opinion) (concluding that a court cannot exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who did not purposely avail herself of the
privilege of doing business in the forum State); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion) (concluding that a mere awareness
that a product may reach a jurisdiction when placed in the stream of commerce is
not enough to satisfy the minimum contacts requirement); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (holding that a non-resident
must purposely avail himself of the state’s privileges and protections for that state
to have personal jurisdiction over him).
68 For an argument that these cases bring United States pleading standards
closer to those in England and elsewhere, see Scott Dodson & James M. Klebba,
Global Civil Procedure Trends in the Twenty-First Century, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 1, 3–8 (2011).
69 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (establishing a “facial
plausibility” standard for pleadings); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
63
64
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development that has inspired a predictably vast amount of
scholarly commentary.70
For the moment, allow me one more example from the Civil
Procedure curriculum, already mentioned above:71 choice of law in
the federal courts—the Erie doctrine, a “key part of the rite of
passage” for American law students.72 Three things about the Erie
doctrine are particularly relevant here. First, students (their
professor hopes) understand that, beneath the Supreme Court’s
lawyerly discussions of precedent and doctrine, lurk larger
questions of sovereignty and law-making power.
Second,
American law students are presented with powerful evidence of
how important procedural rules are. A significant post-Erie lesson
is that plaintiffs, with their penchant for forum-shopping,
obviously think that the identity of the court that hears a lawsuit
may make a big difference to the case’s outcome. Third, the Erie
doctrine teaches students that the line between procedural rules
and substantive rules is highly problematic and difficult to draw.
Debates over procedural rules, just as much as substantive rules,
raise crucial questions of justice and efficiency.

(2007) (ruling that a complaint requires “enough factual matter (taken as true)” to
suggest that the claim is meritorious).
70 Any attempt at an exhaustive list of law review articles on Iqbal and
Twombly would be doomed to failure, but here are some examples: Martin H.
Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost Allocation and
Modern Procedural Theory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773 (2011); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski,
Processing Pleadings and the Psychology of Prejudgment, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 413
(2011); Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment
Discrimination, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 215; Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil
Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597 (2010); Arthur R.
Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell,
Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821 (2010); Adam N.
Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293 (2010); Edward A. Hartnett,
Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (2010); Robert G. Bone,
Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849 (2010); Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the
Regulation of Court Access, 94 IOWA L. REV. 873 (2009); Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading
and the Dilemmas of Modern American Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109 (2009); Richard
A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised)
Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61 (2007).
71 See Section 2.1, supra.
72 Rowe, supra note 33, at 1015 (“[T]his area combines inherent complexity
and interest while being a key part of the rite of passage through which most of us
went and continue to put our students.”).
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The focus on procedure does not end with the first year of law
school. Students often have a variety of procedural options to
choose from in their second and third years. Indeed, the elective
course often considered the most rigorous and demanding in
American law schools—named “Federal Courts,” “Federal Courts
and the Federal System,” “Federal Jurisdiction,” or some variation
thereon—includes a healthy dose of civil procedure, integrated
with grand constitutional themes of federalism and separation of
powers.73 “Fed Courts” is a kind of finishing school for the elite
law student interested in litigation. The class is most often
anchored by a famous casebook penned in the 1950s by Hart and
Wechsler,74 though there are alternative texts.75 The subject-matter
of Federal Courts includes the following topics: the extent of
federal-court jurisdiction; the States’ sovereign immunity from
suits and Congress’ power to abrogate that immunity; Supreme
Court review of state-court decisions; choice of law in the federal
courts (including another helping of Erie doctrine); remedies for
violations of constitutional rights; justiciability (ripeness, mootness,
and the “political question” doctrine); and the power of federal
district courts to abstain from exercising their jurisdiction. The
course requires an understanding of the relations between, on the
one hand, states and their court systems and, on the other, the
federal government and its courts system. These relations are
inseparable from ideological and political conflicts in American
history, from the founding of the Republic, through the era of
Jacksonian Democracy, the Civil War, the Reconstruction Period,
the New Deal, the Civil Rights Era, and so on.
To take but one example, a key topic in Federal Courts is
habeas corpus review of state court judgments of criminal
convictions. The topic straddles civil and criminal procedure.76
73 See Steve Vladeck, Things You Oughta Know if You Teach Federal Courts,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Mar. 21, 2012, 6:48 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfs
blawg/2012/03/things-you-oughta-know-if-you-teach-federal-courts.html
(stating that there are three “classical views” of the Federal Courts course: 1. “as
an advanced civil procedure course”; 2. “as an advanced constitutional law
course”; 3. “as a federal remedies course”) (emphasis omitted).
74 The book is now in its sixth edition: RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART
AND WECHSLER’S FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (6th ed. 2009).
75 See, e.g., PETER W. LOW, JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS (7th ed. 2011).
76 A petition for habeas corpus is a civil action against the jailer. See Donald
A. Dripps, On Reach and Grasp in Criminal Procedure: Crawford in California, 37
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The boundaries of this form of relief have waxed and waned along
with broader shifts in the politics of American federalism and lawand-order politics. In the 1960s, while simultaneously expanding
the procedural rights of criminal defendants, the Supreme Court
opened the doors of the federal district courts to those claiming
that their state court convictions were procured by violations of
those rights. Since then, after a series of decisions by the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts cutting back on this form of relief, a
Republican Congress further restricted the availability of a federal
forum for state prisoners in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996, mandating a host of jurisdictional obstacles for
prisoners and highly deferential standards of review.
Again, reviewing this body of doctrine and its history
impresses upon the student the importance of procedure.77
Students also come into contact with the gargantuan academic
literature that attends Federal Courts questions.78 Only a minority
of students take a Federal Courts class, but those who do go on to
exert a disproportionate influence on the legal system. To a large
extent, these are the students who win fancy clerkships with
federal judges, work as litigators at the most lucrative firms, and,
more importantly, attain influential jobs in government, become
law professors, and later become judges in the higher courts.79
As a further illustration of the richness of American procedural
scholarship, consider the school of thought originating at Yale Law
School in the 1970s and identified as “metaprocedure” by William
Eskridge.80 In a review article of a set of teaching materials by
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 349, 355 (2011) (discussing some of the complexities
that arise when federal courts intervene in state criminal procedure).
77 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why and How to Teach Federal Courts Today, 53 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 693, 693 (2009) (noting the prevalent idea that “a sophisticated
Federal Courts course should yield insights more profound than those that
emerge from any other public law offering,” but calling it a “myth”).
78 See Thomas E. Baker, Federal Court Practice and Procedure: A Third Branch
Bibliography, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 909 (1999 (a two hundred-page long
“comprehensive bibliography of books and articles dealing with the various
aspects of the federal courts and federal court procedures”).
79 See Michael J. Gerhardt, Teaching Federal Courts: Federal Judges as Problem
Solvers, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 729, 734 (2009) (“[Federal Courts] is a course that is
almost always appealing to the students who are on law review or are planning to
do clerkships.”).
80 See generally, Eskridge, supra note 53; see also ROBERT M. COVER & OWEN M.
FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE, at vi (1979) (explaining that the assembled
essays in the book “might be seen as giving preliminary shape to a field of inquiry
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Robert Cover, Owen Fiss, and Judith Resnik, Eskridge felt able to
describe the casebook as “an intellectual Mardi Gras—a joyous,
outrageous, intense feast of ideas that seeks to revolutionize the
subject.”81 By “[e]mphasizing the intellectual and socio-political
structures of procedure rather than its nuts and bolts, Cover, Fiss
and Resnik propound[ed] a radically new way of teaching
procedure to students.”82 The point was to get students to think
fundamentally about the value of procedure, and, for the authors
of the casebook, litigation was “a public event rather than simply a
means of resolving private disputes.”83 Partly because Yale Law
School has produced so many law professors from the ranks of its
former students, the metaprocedure approach spread far beyond
its New Haven home. By the late 1980s, “a significant number of
teachers . . . call[ed] themselves ‘proceduralists.’”84
Nevertheless, many contemporary American proceduralists
apparently consider their field an “academic backwater,”85 when
compared to other legal fields. At the very least, I want to console
American proceduralists with the thought that things could be
much, much worse. As I will suggest in the next section, the view
from outside the United States looks very different indeed.
3.2. A Comparative Example: Civil Procedure at the Periphery in
England
The vibrancy and intensity of American debates about civil
procedure is best understood in comparative relief. Here, I

very much in flux”). For a more skeptical review, see Mark V. Tushnet,
Metaprocedure?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 161 (1989) (criticizing the primary arguments
made in Cover, Fiss, and Resnik’s casebook, PROCEDURE, supra note 53). See also
Linda S. Mullenix, God, Metaprocedure, and Metarealism at Yale, 87 MICH. L. REV.
1139, 1142 (1989) (reflecting on the influence that PROCEDURE, supra note 53, has
had on the procedural debate).
81 Eskridge, supra note 53, at 947.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Mullenix, supra note 80, at 1142.
85 See id. at 1141 (referring to civil procedure as “a legal specialization
normally lacking in intellectual excitement”); Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and
Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 516 (2006) (“[M]y claim that procedure has
become an academic backwater is singing to the choir; those interested enough to
read this Article know what I mean.”)
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contrast the very different position in England.86 England is a close
legal cousin to the United States in many ways, making
comparison a fruitful exercise, because it reduces the number of
variables.87
Moreover, focusing on the English contrast is
particularly useful because it cuts off the argument that an
American-style degree of proceduralism is an inherent feature of
the common-law tradition.88 Given the practical importance of
procedural questions to the lives of lawyers and to the outcome of
cases, the minor role that civil procedure plays in contemporary
English legal education and scholarship is extraordinary.
English legal academics have almost entirely ceded the
territory of civil procedure to the legal profession.89 The most
obvious symptom of civil procedure’s neglect is its marginal place
in legal education. The standard path to a legal career as a solicitor
86 “England” here is shorthand for “England and Wales.” What I say about
England and Wales appears to be true throughout the United Kingdom, but
Scotland’s legal system and culture remain distinct from England’s; Northern
Ireland, too, may present special features that would unduly complicate the
analysis.
87 P.S. Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alternatives: Some Anglo-American Comparisons,
1987 DUKE L.J. 1002, 1004-05 (“England is still thought to share much of American
legal culture and legal ideals, even if, to paraphrase George Bernard Shaw,
England and America sometimes appear to be two countries divided by a
common legal heritage.”) (footnote omitted).
88 I have not sought to gauge the level of proceduralism in civil-law systems.
But there are some suggestions in the literature that, in the twentieth century, at
least, procedure had an even lower scholarly and curricular profile in continental
Europe than in England. See Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity
Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1211 (2005) (“In sharp contrast to American law schools,
which treat the study of procedure as a fundamental component of legal
education, continental European law faculties deem procedure to be of negligible
interest and focus instead on conveying abstract principles of substantive law.”);
Mirjan Damaška, A Continental Lawyer in an American Law School: Trials and
Tribulations of Adjustment, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1368 (1968) (stating that an
American lawyer would be surprised that he would “almost never . . . find
discussion of the influence of procedural considerations on substantive issues’ in a
Continental law faculty”).
89 Hence, Atiyah and Summers wrote in 1987 that “English academics have
abandoned certain subjects entirely to the professions. Thus there is very little (if
any) law school teaching of such subjects as legal ethics and civil procedure.” P.S.
ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL REASONING, LEGAL THEORY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
407 (1987). See also P.S. ATIYAH, PRAGMATISM AND THEORY IN ENGLISH LAW 133
(1987) (“What the academics need to bear in mind is that it is not their task to ape
the practitioners.”).
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or barrister in England is a three-stage process: (1) a three-year
undergraduate degree in law at a university (the “academic
stage”); (2) a year of classroom instruction in the more mundane
knowledge needed to practice law (the “vocational stage”); and (3)
a one-year or two-year period of apprenticeship.90 At the academic
stage, English legal scholars and the students they teach divide law
into the substantive law categories at the core of a law degree:
contract law, tort law, land law, trusts law, constitutional law,
administrative law, and European law.91 The vast majority of
English law students pass through their degrees without ever
thinking seriously about civil procedure. Indeed, it was impossible
in the academic year 2011-12 for an undergraduate law student to
take a civil procedure course at four of the law schools ranked in
the top five by The Times.92 For the most part, anything a student
might learn about civil procedure in the academic stage of legal
education comes accidentally when learning substantive law.93
John Langbein, who studied law in England and in the United
States, has said: “If I were given the power to make one change in

90 Lawyers in England and Wales are either solicitors or barristers. Budding
solicitors spend two years as “trainees” before qualifying. Young barristers spend
one year as “pupils” before being called to the Bar. See Nigel Duncan, Gatekeepers
Training Hurdlers: The Training and Accreditation of Lawyers in England and Wales, 20
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 911, 913 (2004).
91 As a condition of recognizing a law degree, the legal professions require
universities to offer the following compulsory subjects: “(1) Public Law, including
Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, and Human Rights; (2) Law of the
European Union; (3) Criminal Law; (4) Obligations, including Contract,
Restitution, and Tort; (5) Property Law; and, (6) Equity and the Law of Trusts.”
Duncan, supra note 90, at 913 n.6.
92 The top five English law schools in The Times’s “Good University Guide
2011” were as follows: Oxford; Cambridge; the London School of Economics;
University College, London; and Durham. Even at Cambridge, the only one of
the five to offer civil procedure to undergraduates, it could only be taken as a
“half-subject” in the student’s final year. Some of the other schools do offer civil
procedure as an option for post-graduate students taking master’s degrees in law.
93 Some students will learn something about civil procedure when they take
administrative law; many English texts and courses cover the special procedures
governing judicial review of government action. See, e.g., WILLIAM WADE &
CHRISTOPHER FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ch. 18 (10th ed. 2010). And some
students may learn about pre-judgment remedies in courses on Equity. See, e.g.,
JILL E. MARTIN, HANBURY & MARTIN: MODERN EQUITY chs. 23 & 24 (18th ed. 2009).
But the point remains: the vast majority of students never study civil procedure as
a subject in its own right during a law degree.
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English legal education, it would be to have civil procedure taken
seriously.”94
It is not that English civil procedure is devoid of significant
problems to study. Far from it: the past fifteen years have seen the
English legal system in a fairly constant state of procedural
turbulence. The late 1990s brought the Woolf Reforms, named
after the judge whose report on Access to Justice contended that the
civil justice system was too slow, too unequal, too costly, too
uncertain, too fragmented, too adversarial, and too complex. The
Access to Justice report formed the basis for wholesale changes in
the civil litigation system and a whole new set of Civil Procedure
Rules.95 The Woolf Reforms ushered in a new interventionist
approach to case management and aimed to promote the use of
alternative dispute resolution.96 The new rules expand the
availability of summary judgment, a remedy previously
unavailable in large classes of cases.97 Moreover, England has
altered its litigation-funding rules to allow “no win, no fee”
agreements in some cases, prompting radical innovations in the

94 John H. Langbein, Scholarly and Professional Objectives in Legal Education:
American Trends and English Comparisons, in 2 PRESSING PROBLEMS IN THE LAW:
WHAT ARE LAW SCHOOLS FOR? 1, 1 (P.B.H. Birks ed., 1996). See also JACK I.H. JACOB,
THE FABRIC OF ENGLISH CIVIL JUSTICE 252 (The Hamlyn Lectures, Thirty-Eighth
Series, 1986) (noting the “deplorable fact” that civil procedure is generally not a
required subject for obtaining a law degree).
95 The Woolf Reforms also imposed a large-scale reform of terminology in the
hopes of making legal language more accessible to the general public. Thus
England no longer has “plaintiffs,” but instead has “claimants.” Writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus have been renamed “quashing order,”
“prohibiting order,” and “mandatory order,” respectively. A civil action was
previously started by “writ” or by “summons”; now the originating document is a
“claim form.” The pleadings in an action are called the “statements of case.” See
Civil Procedure Rules, 1998, S.I. 1998/3132 (L. 17) (Eng. & Wales) (laying down
the rules of civil procedure in the High Court, county courts, and Court of Appeal
(Civil Division)).
96 See NEIL ANDREWS, THE MODERN CIVIL PROCESS: JUDICIAL AND ALTERNATIVE
FORMS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN ENGLAND pt. III (2008) (discussing alternative
civil justice including settlement, mediation, and the framework of English
arbitration); LORD WOOLF M.R., HM’S STATIONERY OFFICE, LORD CHANCELLORS
DEP’T, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT (1996) (U.K.) (aiming to “simplify and
harmonize” procedures for High Court and county court cases).
97 Civil Procedure Rules, 1998, S.I. 1998/3132 (L. 17) (Eng. & Wales) pt. 24
(touching upon summary judgment, “a procedure by which the court may decide
a claim or a particular issue without a trial”).
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legal profession in the personal injury field,98 and a rearguard
action by insurance companies. Remarkably, a generally favorable
court decision99 has created a fledgling industry devoted to thirdparty funding of litigation.100 And England is experimenting with
the “group action,” a diluted form of the American class action.101
Taken together, these reforms amount to major changes in the
administration of civil justice.
But despite the abundance of procedural tumult, “[c]ivil
procedure scholars are a rare breed.”102 One writer justly notes the
“paucity of rigorous analytical or theoretical literature dealing with
civil justice matters” in common-law countries other than the
United States.103 It is common to lament that writers on English
98 See Herbert M. Kritzer, Fee Regimes and the Cost of Civil Justice, 28 CIV. JUST.
Q. 344 (2009) (analyzing reforms of fee systems for lawyers).
99 Arkin v. Borchard Lines Ltd., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 655, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3055
(Eng.) (permitting the practice of professional third-party litigation funding and
limiting a third-party funder’s liability for costs to the extent of the funding it
provided).
100 See Rachael Mulheron & Peter Cashman, Third-Party Funding of Litigation:
A Changing Landscape, 27 CIV. JUST. Q. 312, 312–13 (2008) (“There has been an
increasing number of litigation funders and brokers entering into the market;
hedge fund interest in backing commercial litigation has expanded; . . . a
consultation by the Office of Fair Trading has endorsed third-party funding in
private actions for breaches of competition law; and Sir Anthony Clarke M.R. has
extra-judicially expressed ‘in principle’ approval for regulated litigation
funding.”) (citing Private Actions in Competition Law: Effective Redress for Consumers
and Business 27-28 (Office of Fair Trading Discussion Paper, OFT916, Apr. 2007),
available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft916.pdf;
Neil Rose, Drive for Transparency on Third-Party Funding, LAW SOC’Y GAZETTE, Feb.
14, 2008, http://www.lawgazette.co.uk/news/drive-transparency-third-partyfunding (“I am in principle a supporter of third-party funding, provided that
appropriate regulation is put in place.”)).
101 See generally Rachael Mulheron, Recent Milestones in Class Actions Reform in
England: A Critique and Proposal, 127 LAW Q. REV. 288 (2011) (discussing the
preference for sectoral reform which English governmental policy-makers have
shown to date).
102 Susan M.C. Gibbons, Book Review, 122 LAW Q. REV. 336, 336 (2006)
(reviewing RACHAEL P. MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON LAW LEGAL
SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2004)); see also JACOB, supra note 94, at 252–
53 (“[T]here is hardly any research taking place in the subject at Universities . . .
[C]ivil procedural law remains the Cinderella of the legal academic world.”). The
problem is longstanding. In 1926, an English legal scholar remarked that “very
little has been written upon Civil Procedure of a critical or analytical character
since the days of Bentham.” See Maurice Amos, A Day in Court at Home and
Abroad, 2 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 340, 340 (1926).
103 See Susan M.C. Gibbons, AAS Zuckerman Civil Procedure, 4 OXFORD U.
COMMONWEALTH L.J. 129, 130 (2004) (book review) (noting that civil procedure has
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civil procedure focus too much on the “nuts and bolts,” and that
scholars should “give more attention to the purposes [civil
[procedure] serves.”104 There are some recent signs of change.105
The implementation of the Woolf Reforms inspired two
outstanding treatises—one emanating from Oxford,106 the other
from Cambridge.107 But these books are bright stars in an
otherwise dark sky, and given their cost, their level of detail, and
the absence of civil procedure on the curriculums of most law
schools, they are mostly read by practitioners and judges.108 One
scholar, reviewing the two treatises in 2005, said that “[t]he
arguments in favour of civil procedure’s forming an important part
of English legal studies have long been overwhelming; yet the
resources have been lacking.”109 Though hopeful for the future, the
reviewer aptly summed up civil procedure’s current position in
England: “many students and academics working on English law
not attracted a high level of academic attention or sustained critical examination
as compared with other areas of law).
104 J.A. JOLOWICZ, ON CIVIL PROCEDURE, at ix (2000) (claiming that English legal
scholars “have concentrated almost exclusively and for far too long on the ‘nuts
and bolts’ of litigation and, in particular, on its costs and its delays”).
105 In addition to doctrinal work, there has also been some serious empirical
work on English civil justice by socio-legal scholars. See, e.g., HAZEL GENN,
JUDGING CIVIL JUSTICE (2010); Hazel Genn, Understanding Civil Justice, 50 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBS. 155 (1997).
106 ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, ZUCKERMAN ON CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES OF
PRACTICE (2006). Cf. Richard L. Marcus, Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism
into a Globalized Context, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 709 (2005) (reviewing, inter alia,
ZUCKERMAN, supra). Zuckerman’s treatise combines an unusual degree of
theoretical rigor with doctrinal discussions. In a recent court decision, the book
was described as a “valuable pioneering exposition of the principles of procedural
law.” Emerald Supplies Ltd. v. British Airways plc, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 1284,
[2011] 2 W.L.R. 203, 205 (Eng.). Unsurprisingly, given the state of English
scholarship on civil procedure, Zuckerman often draws on American materials for
theoretical background.
107 NEIL ANDREWS, ENGLISH CIVIL PROCEDURE: FUNDAMENTALS OF THE NEW
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2003). Cf. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Two Valuable Treatises on
Civil Procedure, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 611 (2005) (reviewing, inter alia,
ANDREWS, supra); Marcus, supra note 106 (reviewing, inter alia, ANDREWS, supra).
108 See Hazard, supra note 107, at 612 (stating that Andrews’s book is “written
primarily for barristers and solicitors engaged in litigation in England”); Dyson
L.J., Book Review, 26 CIV. JUST. Q. 389, 392 (2007) (reviewing ZUCKERMAN, supra
note 106) (stating that Zuckerman’s book “should be in the library of anyone who
is a serious civil litigation practitioner”).
109 Ben McFarlane, Book Review, 121 LAW Q. REV. 343, 343 (2005) (reviewing
ZUCKERMAN, supra note 106, and ANDREWS, supra note 107) (“[I]t has always been a
struggle to find general treatments which can both inform and inspire.”).
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have not been disabused of the mistaken but tenacious impression
that civil procedure consists of an arbitrary set of technical rules, to
be endured in the real world but ignored in university.”110 There
are a few notable exceptions to this general rule, but the small
number of dedicated English civil procedure scholars must feel
isolated among, and underappreciated by, their colleagues.111
4.

PROCEDURALISM-PROMOTING FEATURES OF
AMERICAN CIVIL LITIGATION

One obvious form of explanation for the American
exceptionalism identified in Section 3 is to say that procedure
simply matters more to American civil justice. Americans have
shown greater faith in civil litigation than their counterparts
elsewhere, and more willingness to harness the power of “private
Attorneys-General.”112 And procedural questions justifiably loom
larger in a system, like the American, where power over civil
litigation is divided among several different actors—state courts
and federal courts, judges and juries. Based on these relatively
distinctive features of American litigation, one might argue that
questions of procedure rightly demand a larger share of American
attention. I believe these reasons do not fully account for
American proceduralism, but they are a significant part of the
story. Again, I draw on the comparative example of England for
support.
4.1. American Faith in Private Litigation
For several decades, American courts and legislatures were
considerably more likely than their equivalents in other nations to
respond to a social problem by conferring a private cause of action.
Where other nations have relied on social pressure or regulatory
actions by government agencies to check undesirable behaviour,
Americans have often chosen instead to confer power on
Id.
See ANDREWS, supra note 107, at 23 (civil procedure is “barely on the
curricular map except in a handful of universities”).
112 See Hazard, supra note 107, at 623 (“In both England and Germany,
redress of injuries is regarded as a social responsibility to be managed through
state regulatory systems, such as health care in the case of personal injury. In the
United States, on the other hand, injuries primarily have been addressed in terms
of private initiative and allocation of responsibility among private actors through
adjudication.”).
110
111
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individual plaintiffs and their lawyers to bring lawsuits and hold
defendants in check.
This observation is commonplace in
comparative-law studies of American legal system.113 Americans
have been willing to depart from traditional conceptions of civil
litigation to make it easier for plaintiffs to hold defendants
accountable. Again, the English counter-example is instructive.
Benjamin Kaplan—a Harvard proceduralist and previously the
Reporter to the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure—observed in 1971 that “in England social problems
have not framed themselves so readily as cases for the courts; the
courts by reason of long disengagement have not been looked to as
dynamic instruments of public betterment.”114 Social problems, we
might add, do not really “frame themselves”; people frame them in
certain ways.115
One symptom of American enthusiasm for pursuing regulatory
goals via private litigation is the ability of juries applying state tort
law to award large amounts of punitive damages in personal
injury cases—notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s attempts to
cabin their ability to do so.116 Multiple damages are also available
in many areas of American law by legislative choice.
Congressional authorization of treble damages in federal antitrust
cases even led to diplomatic friction between the United Kingdom
and the United States during the the 1970s and 1980s.117 Another
113 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability
Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 291–92 (2010) (noting that many Europeans
remain skeptical of the forms of “entrepreneurial litigation” developed in the
United States); Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative
Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 288–301 (2002) (outlining exceptional features of
American procedure: the civil jury, the party-driven discovery process, the
passive judge, and the role of warring experts).
114 Kaplan, supra note 6, at 845 (arguing that “much more is involved [in
questions of procedural reform] than judgments about narrow procedural
devices”).
115 See ERVING GOFFMANN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION
OF EXPERIENCE (1974); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions
and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453 (1981) (“The psychological principles
that govern the perception of decision problems and the evaluation of
probabilities and outcomes produce predictable shifts of preference when the
same problem is framed in different ways.”).
116 See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (holding that an
award of $2,000,000 in punitive damages was grossly excessive).
117 See, e.g., W.C. Beckett, United Kingdom, in Symposium, Transnational
Litigation—Part II: Perspectives from the U.S. and Abroad, 18 INT’L LAW. 773 (1984)
(discussing the significance of United Kingdom’s Protection of Trading Interests
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obvious result of greater American enthusiasm for “plaintiff
power” is the class action. Even as Congress and state legislatures
have sought to curtail the class action, the political machinations
and interest-group politics behind class action reform provide yet
more grist for the American proceduralists’ mills.
Even after many years of conservative backlash,118 various
features of the American civil justice system remain more favorable
to plaintiffs than those of equivalent economically advanced
nations. Parallel developments in the English law of supracompensatory damages, for example, have been considerably more
cautious, with the courts hewing closely to the notion that the
purpose of tort law is to award compensation.119 The longstanding
ability of American plaintiffs’ lawyers to aggregate and control
many small claims constitutes—to English eyes—a remarkable
departure from the traditional bipolar conception of litigation,
giving rise to new kinds of lawsuit and a whole host of legal and
ethical issues. Even after curtailments of the American class action,
the English equivalent—the “group action”—remains in the early
stages of its development and is exceedingly tame by
comparison.120
Act 1980 as a legislative response to what it saw as excessive claims to
jurisdiction).
118 See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding
Accountability, 81 TEX. L. REV. 285 (2002) (discussing decades of criticism of trends
in tort law and calls for “tort reform”).
119 See Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.) (Eng.) (holding that
exemplary damages were only available in three situations: “(i) oppressive,
arbitrary or unconstitutional actions by government servants; (ii) where the
defendant’s conduct had been calculated by him to make a profit for himself
which might well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff; (iii) where
expressly authorized by statute . . . .”). In recent years, however, English courts
have loosened this restrictive approach in modest ways. See, e.g., Kuddus v. Chief
Constable of Leicestershire Constabulary, [2001] UKHL 29, [2002] 2 A.C. 122
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (“[T]here is no basis in Rookes v Barnard [1964]
AC 1129 for the view that the power to award exemplary damages exists only in
torts which had been decided to have that character prior to 1964.”).
120 One major difference is that English courts have so far taken a strict view
of the “representativeness” requirement for an American-style “opt-out” class
action. A representative party must have the “same interest” as those she
represents. In a striking recent example, the English Court of Appeal refused to
allow a collective litigation of an antitrust claim by direct and indirect purchasers
of freight services. Emerald Supplies Ltd. v. British Airways plc, [2010] EWCA
(Civ) 1284, [2011] 2 W.L.R. 203, 218 (Eng.). By way of contrast, a similar putative
class action is proceeding in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, and has already yielded several multi-million-dollar
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Relatedly, the phenomemon of “public law litigation”121—
which allows judges to assume ongoing supervisory powers over
schools, hospitals, prisons, police departments—“has no
counterpart in England.”122 For reasons political and practical,
public law litigation has fallen out of favor to some extent since its
1970s heyday, but the recent Supreme Court decision requiring
California to reduce its prison population is a compelling reminder
of the potential power of American civil litigation to force
wholesale institutional changes.123
No comparative sketch of the English and American civil
justice systems would be complete without considering the
allocation of responsibility for attorney’s fees. Under the “English
rule,” the loser pays the winner’s costs and lawyers’ fees, while
under the “American rule,” each side bears its own costs and
fees.124 To the extent that America departs from the American rule,
it does so mainly to provide one-way fee-shifting in favor of
victorious plaintiffs in civil rights and consumer law cases as a
means of encouraging these classes of plaintiff to bring suit.
Meanwhile, before deciding to file an action, the English claimant
must consider the risk that she will both lose her case and be
obligated to pay the defendant’s legal bills. Predictably, fewer
English claimants are willing to stick their heads above the parapet
to test the law’s outer limits. In turn, American lawyers must
expend more of their energies on devices that allow courts, before
trial, to dispose with the greater volume of meritless cases that
results from the more plaintiff-friendly rules.
In sum, the American litigation system is a rough-and-tumble
world, ripe with political controversy. By comparison, the more
settlements. See In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., No. 06–MD–1775
(JG)(VVP), 2011 WL 2909162 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2011) (involving antitrust claims
brought by indirect and direct purchasers against airlines engaging in price fixing
in the air cargo industry).
121 See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (discussing public law litigation and how it might
redefine the place of law and courts in American politics).
122 ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 89, at 152.
123 See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1929 (2011) (“[W]hen necessary to
ensure compliance with a constitutional mandate, courts may enter orders placing
limits on a prison’s population.”).
124 E.g., David A. Root, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing,
Contrasting, and Combining the “American Rule” and “English Rule,” 15 IND. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 583 (2005).
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stable English procedural regime seems to lack the capacity to
provoke such impassioned debate.
4.2. Fragmentation of Power in American Civil Justice
American enthusiasm for private litigation, however, is not
enough to explain America’s exceptional proceduralism. True, the
greater availability and potency of American lawsuits generates a
great deal of procedural interest, but it also throws up many issues
of substantive law. To continue our comparative reference point,
English legal scholars seem to allocate just as great a proportion of
their scholarly efforts to civil litigation. The difference is that
English scholars are overwhelmingly drawn to writing about
judges’ rulings on substantive law, rather than in the procedural
questions the judges resolve along the way. We find a somewhat
more satisfying explanation for the greater American interest in
procedure, however, when we add to our analysis the differing
structures of the contrasting legal systems.
In short, civil procedure matters more in America because
authority over civil cases is divided among a greater number of
different entities.125 Most procedural doctrine is concerned with
delineating the boundaries between these entities. In England,
decision-making power is concentrated with a single, relatively
homogeneous, group of judges. Accordingly, there is often no real
English equivalent to the procedural questions that provoke the
most spirited debate in America; these concern the divisions of
power among federal courts and the various state courts, and
between judge and jury. Benjamin Kaplan noticed this striking
difference between English and American litigation after spending
a few days in London’s Royal Courts of Justice.126 Kaplan
125 See MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 223 (photo. reprint 1991) (1986);
Tamaruya, supra note 6, at 364 (unlike in England, “[t]he American procedure is
overtly political not only in the sense that the politicians are actively involved but
also in the sense that the debates on procedures concern the distribution of power
among different decision-makers or different groups of people in the society.”).
Relatedly, Atiyah and Summers note that “[b]y comparison with the English
position, the United States has a veritable profusion of formal sources of law.”
ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 89, at 55.
126 Kaplan, supra note 6, at 821. Kaplan noticed that procedural matters were
largely resolved by masters rather than judges, and commented that “[o]ne
connects the masters’ work with the fact that procedure in England has been put
in the adjective or subordinate place where it seems to belong.” Id. at 828.
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suggested that civil procedure had a lesser place in England
because “England is a legal unit without the complications of
competency, jurisdiction, and venue that can bedevil an action in a
federal system.”127
For example, the horizontal allocation of sovereign power
among the several states, along with geographic scale, largely
accounts for the importance of personal jurisdiction questions in
America. For the most part, these issues arise when a plaintiff sues
a defendant from one state in a court located in another state.128 As
well as the sheer inconvenience of litigating in a far-flung place—
America is a big country—the defendant may be concerned that
the plaintiff’s chosen forum will be less favorable to her than
another. For obvious reasons, these questions arise less often in
England, where a greater proportion of litigation is conducted
solely by parties from the single, unitary jurisdiction of England
and Wales.129
In the United States federal courts, the scope of federal
jurisdiction is crucial in part because parties and observers rightly
discern significant differences between federal judges (appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate) and state-court
judges (many of whom are elected or are at least subject to
retention elections.)130 To take another example, the Erie doctrine is
so important to American lawyers because it represents the federal
courts’ attempt to define the area where they must defer to the
Id.
Of course, some American personal jurisdiction cases involve defendants
from outside the United States. See supra note 67 (discussing McIntyre, an action
brought in New Jersey against a defendant incorporated in England, and Asahi, a
case brought in California against Japanese manufacturer).
129 Procedural questions do loom large in the small, but important, field of
transnational commercial litigation in England. See, e.g., LAWRENCE COLLINS ET AL.,
DICEY, MORRIS AND COLLINS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (14th ed. 2008). More
broadly, in recent years, two rival court systems—the European Court of Human
Rights and the courts of the European Union—have begun to chip away at the
English courts system’s near-monopoly on adjudicative authority over English
disputes. But the contrast with the United States remains stark, especially because
there are no European equivalents (yet) to the federal district courts. The recent
agreement for a unifed European patent court is an important indication of likely
future moves towards more intrusive European Union authority over
adjudication. See Owen Bowcott, Unified Patent Court Split Between Paris, London
and Munich, GUARDIAN, July 3, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/jul/
03/unified-patent-court-london.
130 See JED SHUGERMAN, THE PEOPLE’S COURTS: THE RISE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
AND JUDICIAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012).
127
128
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law-making authority of the several States. Many other key topics
in American civil procedure also draw their significance from the
fact of judicial federalism, including the scope of federal court
jurisdiction, the rules governing removal from state court to federal
court in cases of jurisdiction, and the rules governing
interjurisdictional preclusion.
That these questions have
constitutional significance reinforces the prestige of the field.
The importance of federalism to the American procedural
system is even more obvious when one turns to the subject matter
of the Federal Courts course. The shifting extent of State sovereign
immunity and Congress’s power to abrogate it are bound up with
the tussle between national authority and the prerogatives of the
States. Studying the scope the United States Supreme Court’s
power to review state court decisions similarly entails
consideration of questions of federalism. And much of the topic of
abstention arises from the possibility of concurrent litigation in
state and federal courts.131 Again, the subject of federal habeas
corpus review of state-court criminal judgments exists because of
the divided authority between state courts and federal courts.
There is no equivalent form of review in England’s unitary legal
system, where the only kind of judicial post-conviction relief is a
new appeal within the same system.132 Indeed, two acute
observers of the differences between England and America noted
in 1987 that “[t]he whole concept of collateral attack is utterly alien
to English lawyers, and indeed seems to them to be subversive of
the authority of judicial decisions.”133
131 See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 588
(1985) (discussing the various doctrines under which federal courts abstain from
exercising their jurisdiction, and noting the need for federal courts to avoid
“undue interference” with the states).
132 See Criminal Justice Act, 1995, (A.S.P. 46) 51 & 52, c. 44 (Eng.) (indicating
that under the current system for review of previously adjudicated criminal cases,
the Criminal Cases Review Commission considers applications for postconviction review and refers cases to the Court of Appeal of England and Wales—
the same court to which an initial appeal goes in a serious criminal case).
133 ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 89, at 217. This statement is no longer true
without qualification; collateral attack has gained ground in England since several
miscarriages of justice came to light in the late 1980s and early 1990s. See David
Wolitz, Innocence Commissions and the Future of Post-Conviction Review, 52 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1027, 1042 (2010) (“A number of high-profile exonerations in the 1980s and
1990s raised concerns in the U.K. about the prevalence of wrongful convictions
and the paucity of mechanisms to correct them. In particular, the case of the
“Birmingham Six”—six Irish men falsely convicted of bombing a pub in
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Even once jurisdictional issues are settled, a major division of
power remains in most American civil cases134 between judge and
jury.135 This divide explains the relentless American scholarly
focus on the standards for summary judgment. Though American
and English judges alike have the power to grant summary
judgment rather than allowing the case to proceed to trial, the
stakes are very different. In England, the right to jury trial in civil
cases has largely been abolished,136 so denying a motion for
summary judgment means that the case goes to trial before a judge,
usually the same judge who ruled on the summary judgment
motion. In the United States, the decision to deny summary
judgment generally means that the case will be tried (if at all) to a
jury. Accordingly, the effect of the Supreme Court’s concerted
Birmingham—galvanized public opinion when their convictions were overturned
in 1991. In response, the British Home Secretary created a blue-ribbon panel, the
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, and charged it with the task of examining
the causes of wrongful convictions and recommending better procedures for
dealing with such miscarriages of justice.”); IN THE NAME OF THE FATHER
(Universal Pictures 1993) (depicting a case similar to the Birmingham Six, that of
the “Guildford Four”).
134 Some American civil cases are tried to a judge alone, but in most, the
parties have a constitutional right to a jury and the plaintiff asserts that right. In
the federal district courts, the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
protects the right to trial by jury in cases “at common law.” The federal right does
not apply in state court, but most states have similar constitutional protections for
jury trial rights. In this context and others, the constitutional element adds a
certain element of glamour to American civil procedure.
135 Though actual jury trials are rare, parties reach settlement agreements in
the shadow of the jury. See Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DISP.
RESOL. 7, 13 (2006) (“The promise of full-blown adjudication in a public forum, a
‘day in court’ is increasingly redeemed by ‘bargaining in the shadow of the
law.’”).
136 See Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 69 (Eng.) (indicating that the right to
trial by jury remains for defamation, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution actions; however, even within the category of cases where a general
right remains, a bench trial may be held where “the court is of the opinion that the
trial requires any prolonged examination of documents or any scientific or local
investigation which cannot be conveniently made with a jury”). Though London
is the “libel capital of the world,” and the parties in libel cases presumptively have
a right to trial by jury, libel trials with juries are now rare. Under proposed
reforms, English civil juries may soon be a thing of the past. See Josh Halliday,
Removing Libel Juries Would Be Dangerous, Warns Newspaper Industry, GUARDIAN,
May 11, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/may/11/libel-lawdefamation-reform (“The government’s draft bill, unveiled in March, signalled an
end to the use of juries in all but exceptional circumstances. The bill removes the
presumption in favour of a jury trial as part of measures to cut costs and speed up
court cases.”).
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effort in the 1980s to make summary judgment more freely
available to defendants in the federal courts137 was to reduce
democratic participation in the civil justice system.138 One scholar
has even asserted that the increased use of summary judgment in
the federal courts violates plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to trial by
jury.139 Summary judgment could not provoke such excitement in
England.
A distinctive feature of American litigation, its all-inclusive
party-driven approach to discovery, is another instance of
fragmentation of power within the litigation process. And the
pleading rules are so important in America because, once a
plaintiff gets over the initial hurdle of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim,140 she is entitled to demand from the
137 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (providing that a party is entitled to summary
judgment where there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact”). See also
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 316 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 572
(1986) (the trilogy of cases in 1986 where the United States Supreme Court
broadened access to summary judgment).
138 See Paul D. Carrington, The Civil Jury and American Democracy, 13 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 79, 93 (2003) (“Citizen participation in the disposition of civil
cases has been an important, indeed central, and perhaps critical, element in the
development of the American legal system.”).
139 See Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L.
REV. 139, 142 (2007) (“I conclude that summary judgment should be eliminated
altogether because it is unconstitutional under the Seventh Amendment.”).
Typically, given the vibrant scholarly debate on civil procedure in America,
Professor Thomas’s provocative article produced a flurry of responses. See, e.g.,
Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment Is Constitutional, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1625, 1627
(2008) (“[T]he argument that summary judgment is unconstitutional depends on a
rigid, erroneous interpretation of the Seventh Amendment.”); William E. Nelson,
Summary Judgment and the Progressive Constitution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1653 (2008)
(arguing against an originalist interpretation of the Seventh Amendment). For
Professor Thomas’s reply, see Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment Is Still
Unconstitutional: A Reply to Professors Brunet and Nelson, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1667
(2008).
140 In an American federal court, though the filing of a motion to dismiss
generally does not automatically stay the defendant’s discovery obligations, a
successful motion to dismiss by the defendant will often intervene before the
plaintiff has obtained substantial discovery. See Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New
Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 69 (2010) (“The rules say nothing specifically about
the availability of discovery pending a motion to dismiss. As an original matter,
at least, the drafters probably did not contemplate the need for such discovery, for
under the liberalized pleading standard of Rule 8, the assumption was that
discovery would not be needed to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Twombly and Iqbal may change this dynamic, but it [is] not clear in what
direction.”)
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defendant, without judicial approval, any evidence that might be
relevant to the case, and to conduct depositions of the defendant
and of third-party witnesses.141 In England, with its more
restrained approach to discovery, the stakes on a motion to strike
out a claim are lower because, even if the defendant’s motion fails,
the court still has the power to rein in unnecessary discovery
demands. It is easy to see why English scholars spend little time
thinking about pleading, while, for Americans, it is often allimportant.
Similar observations emerge from the comparative work of
Masayuki Tamaruya on the very specific topic of “freezing
injunctions”—pre-trial orders that restrain a defendant from
dealing with assets in such a way as to avoid future execution of a
later money judgment.142 Freezing injunctions are widely available
in England,143 but the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that federal
district courts lack the power to issue an equivalent form of relief—
partly because freezing injunctions were not traditionally available
in English chancery practice at the time of American
independence.144
While English practice evolved, the U.S.
Supreme Court seemed to cling to an outmoded position in this
fairly technical area of procedural doctrine.
Seeking an
explanation for the contrasting approaches, Tamaruya finds the
answer partly in the politicization of American civil procedure
reform, which hinders the ability of judges to undertake explicit,
141 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (referring expressly to the
“burdens of discovery” that would otherwise be imposed on the defendants when
justifying the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim). See also Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 556 (2007) (“Asking for plausible grounds to infer an
agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it
simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”).
142 See Masayuki Tamaruya, The Anglo-American Perspective on Freezing
Injunctions, 29 CIV. JUST. Q. 350, 350 (2010) (“Freezing injunctions have been
adopted in most common law jurisdictions as an effective civil remedy to combat
attempts by recalcitrant debtors or fraudsters to frustrate potential money
judgments by use of ever faster methods of fund transfer. The United States,
however, provided a conspicuous exception.”).
143 See Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v International Bulkcarriers S.A.,
[1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 509 (A.C.) (establishing the English courts’ ability to grant
freezing injunctions).
144 See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527
U.S. 308, 318 (1999) (“We must ask, therefore, whether the relief respondents
requested here was traditionally accorded by courts of equity.”).
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unilateral reform of civil procedure.145 In England, judges are able
to go quietly and informally about the business of procedural
reform, because “a few core members of the judiciary and the bar
keep a firm grip on the reform of civil procedure.”146 American
procedure, on the other hand, is “overtly political[,] not only in the
sense that the politicians are actively involved but also in the sense
that the debates on procedures concern the distribution of power
among different decision-makers or different groups of people in
the society.”147
5.

PROCEDURE AND THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT

Still, even these differences do not fully explain American
exceptionalism in the focus on procedure. Certainly, it makes sense
that procedural questions should occupy a somewhat greater
proportion of the energies of American legal scholars. But these
explanations fail to account for (what must seem to English eyes)
the scale of American obsession with procedure or (what must
seem to American eyes) an extraordinary degree of apathy about
procedural law in the English legal academy. Civil procedure
remains marginal in England even though large-scale reforms in
the last fifteen years must surely have had profound effects on the
outcomes of cases, the structure of the legal professions, and the
behavior of citizens subject to the substantive law that legal
scholars continue to focus on. Moreover, that America “does
more” with litigation and disperses power among different actors
may, in part, be symptoms rather than just causes of American
legal culture’s fascination with procedure.
Consequently, I
propose that we seek deeper reasons for the divergence, embedded
in the history of law and legal thought in the two countries. When
one takes a historical turn in procedure, the comparison between
American law and English law is particularly apt, and, I think,
especially revealing.
I show in this Section that there is a strong connection between
the rise of Legal Realism and the prominence of legal procedure in
America. I do not mean to say simply that Legal Realism “caused”
145 In reality, as the Iqbal and Twombly cases show, the Supreme Court has
been willing to make new procedural law under cover of “interpreting” the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
146 Tamaruya, supra note 142, at 363.
147 Id.
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American proceduralism, though that appears to be partly true. To
the extent that there is a causal relationship, it may well be
mutual—proceduralism may encourage realism and vice versa. I
tell the comparative story in the following way. First, I explain that
legal theorists in both England and America embraced substantive
law more and more as the nineteenth century progressed,
relegating procedure to a minor place in the burgeoning legal
academies of both countries. Indeed, the period around the turn of
the twentieth century can fairly be described as a period of
intellectual unity between the legal elites of England and
America,148 a unity that included a shared belief in “legal science”
and the primacy of substantive law. However, when Legal
Realism swept through the American law schools, the commonlaw consensus broke down. As part of the rupture between
England and America, American scholars and the lawyers whose
minds they shaped attached a greater degree of importance to the
realities of law-application, at the expense of their erstwhile
concentration on the conceptual coherence of substantive law.
England did not have a Realist revolution, and also has never fully
embraced civil procedure as a worthy field of academic study. In
the ensuing decades, the structure of English legal education has
helped to entrench the substantive-law focus of English legal
academia, holding back the encroachment of procedural ideas into
the domain of substance.
5.1. The Dominance of Procedural Categories Until the LateEighteenth Century
Though it is possible to look back and classify centuries of
common-law practice in substantive law terms,149 that way of
thinking came surprisingly late in the history of common-law
thought.
Looking back on the previous centuries from a
nineteenth-century perspective, Maine stated that “substantive law
has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of
148 See RICHARD A. COSGROVE, OUR LADY THE COMMON LAW: AN ANGLOAMERICAN LEGAL COMMUNITY, 1870–1930, at 66 (1987) (noting that, by the 1880s
“the interpretation of the United States as a worthy offspring of England had
gained respectability among Victorian intellectuals.”).
149 David Ibbeston’s book on the history of the common law of contract, tort,
and unjust enrichment is a self-conscious attempt to find substantive principles of
law in the practices of more procedurally minded lawyers. DAVID J. IBBETSON, A
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS (1999).
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procedure.”150 And procedural categories dominated legal thought
for intensely practical reasons. One grand procedural divide was
the distinction between courts of law and courts of equity. Within
the common-law courts, eighteenth-century lawyers still organized
their thinking around the forms of action. In essence, a form of
action was a verbal formula the courts would recognize as an
appropriate means of starting a particular kind of case.151 In real
property cases, for example, the plaintiff had to choose between a
writ of right, an assize of novel disseisein, and an action in
ejectment. In the contractual setting, an action of assumpsit would
usually do the trick, but the actions of debt or covenant remained a
possibility. And so on.
The forms of action, bogged down by steady accretion of
technical learning, provided the prism through which common
lawyers saw the law. The result of choosing the wrong form of
action could be severe: if the court found that the plaintiff’s case
did not fall within the requirement of the chosen form, the case
might be dismissed with prejudice to bringing the action in another
form. In addition, the particular form of action sometimes dictated
the proper court where the action could be brought. Moreover,
different forms of action entailed different ways of serving process
on the defendant, different potential prejudgment remedies, and
differing availability of default judgment. The chosen form of
action also affected the defendant’s pleading obligations, the mode
of trial (Jury or judge? If a jury, what form of jury?), and the kind
of post-judgment remedies available.
The courts sometimes allowed the law to develop by indulging
legal fictions: once the court accepted the fiction, a plaintiff could
use a form of action to bring his suit even though he could not
really establish one of its elements.152 Common-law lawyers in the
late-eighteenth century spent vast amounts of energy deploying
150 HENRY SUMNER MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389
(Arno Press 1975) (1883).
151 In 1829, the Common Law Commissioners identified seventeen different
ways of commencing an action in the common-law courts in England. ROYAL
COMM’N ON THE COMMON LAW, FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON THE
PRACTICE AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SUPERIOR COURTS OF COMMON LAW (1829),
reprinted in 9 IRISH UNIVERSITY PRESS SERIES OF BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY PAPERS 72–4
(P. Ford & G. Ford eds., 1970).
152 Bentham detected “the pestilential breath of fiction” everywhere in
English law. JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A
FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 411 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977).
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and debating the applicability of arbitrary rules, rather than on the
substance of the parties’ dispute or the justice of their cases.
Procedural wrangling is perhaps an inherent part of any system of
laws and courts—a price we pay for subjecting human behavior in
a complex society to rules detailed enough to usefully guide
conduct and fetter official discretion. By the late-eighteenth
century, however, the common law had plainly lost its bearings.
5.2. The Nineteenth-Century Rise of Substance
The substance-procedure distinction began to emerge from
late-eighteenth-century rationalizations of the common law
through the works of two great adversaries, William Blackstone
and Jeremy Bentham. If nothing else, Blackstone and Bentham
shared a desire to impose some kind of analytical rigor on the
common law. Blackstone, drawing on the civil law tradition,
aimed to uncover the rights and wrongs recognized by English
law, as distinct from the methods for enforcing them.153
Accordingly, his Commentaries were partly responsible for
developing a division between substance and procedure.154 But it
was Bentham who made the substance-procedure distinction
explicit.155 “Laws prescribing the course of procedure,” Bentham
said, “have . . . been characterized by the term adjective laws, in
contradistinction to those other laws . . . [that] have been
153 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 35
(1765–69) (explaining that the common law should be viewed as setting forth “a
general map of the law”); see also WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND (1756) (providing a critical analysis of English laws and their basis).
154 See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78
WASH. L. REV. 429, 458-60 (2003) (exploring Blackstone’s introduction of substance
and procedure as fundamentally different concepts); Stephen N. Subrin, How
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 929–30 (1987) (“Blackstone atomized the study
of law by separating not only rights from wrongs, but also the methods of
enforcement from both.”).
155 See D. Michael Risinger, “Substance” and “Procedure” Revisited with Some
Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of “Irrebuttable Presumptions,” 30 UCLA
L. REV. 189, 191 (1982) (“The dichotomy was fathered by Jeremy Bentham in a
1782 work entitled Of Laws in General, sub nom the distinction between substantive
law and adjective law.”). Of Laws in General was substantially completed in 1782
but was not discovered until 1939. See JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL, at
xxxi (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970) (noting that the work was unknown until 1939 when
it was discovered by Professor Charles Warren Everett at University College
London).
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characterized by the correspondent opposite term, substantive
laws.”156
Bentham did not wish merely to draw an analytic distinction
between substance and procedure. Indeed, his very terminology
suggested that procedure should be merely adjectival. Bentham
sought to “degrade procedure from its prior position of equality in
the legal enterprise to a position subordinate to the substantive
law.”157 The substance-procedure distinction took hold both in his
own country and in the newly-independent United States. So, too,
did Bentham’s desire to sweep away anachronistic procedural
technicalities, and his belief in the central importance of
substantive law, rather than procedure.
5.2.1. English Procedural Reform and the Rise of Substantive
Legal Categories
In the early-nineteenth century, the life of English law was still
governed by the forms of action, and the jurisdictional divide
between law and equity remained intact. But as the nineteenth
century progressed, dissatisfaction with the writ system and other
pleading technicalities grew. Bentham’s relentless critiques of the
common law, though extreme, struck a chord in Victorian England.
Reform-minded lawyers chafed at a system of writs whose
boundaries owed more to accidents of history than any rational
scheme of organization. More and more, those who sought to
rationalize the law—the treatise-writers—organized their works
around “scientific” substantive categories rather than the
discredited forms of action.158
156 JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE, WITH THE OUTLINES OF
A PROCEDURE CODE, reprinted in 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 5 (John Bowring
ed., 1843); see also Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1225, 1231

n.10, 1240 (2001) (“It was Jeremy Bentham who made the distinction between
substantive law and procedure . . . prominent. . . . This new conceptual distinction
helped Bentham . . . make the case that English law remained intellectually and
practically incoherent because substantive legal rights and duties were learned and
classified for practice under the jumbled array of procedural forms that had grown
up over the centuries to enforce them.”).
157 Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., “There’ll Always Be an England”: The Instrumental
Ideology of Evidence, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1204, 1213 (1987) (reviewing WILLIAM
TWINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (1985)).
158 See A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles
and the Forms of Legal Literature, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 632 (1981) (exploring the
predominance of the view that law was a science amongst treatise writers).
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In England, Parliament abolished the forms of action over a
forty-year period in the nineteenth century in a series of legislative
acts aimed at simplifying common-law procedure. It was not until
the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875 that the forms of action were
finally buried and common-law procedure was reduced, in
essence, to a single form of action. The Judicature Acts also
lessened the effect of another major procedural divide—the
distinction between the courts of common law and the courts of
equity. Though courts took pains to make clear that only the
administration of law and equity were fused, rather than the bodies
of substantive law that were previously administered in the
separate courts, administrative fusion obviously lessened the
importance of what was once a grand jurisdictional divide.159
The abolition of the forms of action was partly a result of the
rise of substantive legal thought, and once the forms were out of
the way, substantive categories rose to the fore. These categories
were preeminently based on legal theory (contract, tort, property),
but there were also some contextual categories (commercial paper,
marine insurance). The Judicature Acts aided the process by
bringing about “the ultimate separation of substantive law from
procedure,” which “made possible the belief . . . that legal rights
and obligations are one thing, the machinery and procedures for
their recognition and enforcement another.”160
The dramatic lessening of importance in procedure in the life of
English lawyers coincided with the emergence of the university
legal scholar in England. The great “rationalization” of the legal
system loosened procedure’s grip on the common-law legal mind,
but civil procedure was still of great moment to practicing lawyers,
as always. What was different was that those who taught and
produced scholarship about English law began to neglect civil
procedure as a field of study. For the most part, those with
positions on the newly-emerging English law faculties had little or
no practical experience. Their ideas were inspired by Roman and
159 Though the administration of law and equity is fused, English lawyers
continue to observe a more rigorous separation between common-law and
equitable ideas than American courts. The process of fusion continues today, to
the impatience of some scholars. See Andrew Burrows, We Do This at Common Law
but That in Equity, 22 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2002) (arguing that lawyers should
do more to bring together common law and equity).
160 J.A. Jolowicz, ‘General Ideas’ and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 295, 300 (1983).
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German legal theorists, and many appear to have considered
procedure beneath them. Substance was king.
Speaking to law students at the University of Cambridge on the
forms of action at the end of the nineteenth century, F.W. Maitland
recognized that he was swimming against the tide in asking
students of English law to focus on procedure rather than
substance:
It may—I am well aware of it—be objected that procedure
is not a good theme for academic discussion. Substantive
law should come first—adjective law, procedural law,
afterwards. The former may perhaps be studied in a
University, the latter must be studied in chambers.161
Though Maitland disagreed profoundly with this way of
thinking—claiming famously that the forms of action “still rule us
from their graves”—he recognized that it represented the
dominant way of thinking among England’s still-embryonic
university law faculties.
5.2.2. American Procedural Reform and the Rise of Substantive
Legal Categories
Like their English counterparts, American lawyers—to the
extent they imported the complex body of procedural learning
developed in the King’s courts—grew discontented with the forms
of action as the nineteenth century progressed.162
The most significant nineteenth-century procedural reform to
result from this dissatisfaction was the Field Code of 1848, some
form of which was adopted in more than half the States.163 The
Code, devised by David Dudley Field and the New York
Commission on Practice and Pleading, was inspired by the
161 F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: ALSO, THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW:
TWO COURSES OF LECTURES 294 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1913).
162 See WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE
IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830 (1975); Paul D.
Carrington, Teaching Civil Procedure: A Retrospective View, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311,
317 (1999) (“Among those sharing Bentham’s scorn of common law procedure
were Jacksonians, who regarded English procedure as just another burden the
aristocracy imposed on honest folk as a means of preserving the wealth and status
of lawyers.”).
163 See Subrin, supra note 154, at 931–39 (describing the Field Code’s attempt
to merge common law and equity).
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Benthamite tradition of legal reform, which prized legislative
arrangement over common-law development. Most significantly,
the Field Code merged the administration of law and equity, and it
rejected the forms of action. Plaintiffs and defendants would now
be required to plead relevant facts satisfying the elements of a
substantive law cause of action, rather than recite the apposite
procedural verbal formula. Field, of course, was a proceduralist,
but, like Bentham, his ultimate aim was to demote procedure from
its previously privileged place. In keeping with the growing focus
on substance, Field viewed procedure as a kind of tool in the
service of the substantive law; he aimed to remove obstacles to the
“swift, economic, and predictable enforcement of discrete,
carefully articulated rights.”164 (Field also helped to devise a Code
of substantive law, which was never enacted.)
The process of procedural reform in America was more
complex than in England because each system of civil justice, state
and federal, proceeded at its own pace. But as American reformers
left the forms of action and the law-equity split behind, they
cleared the way for scholars in the law schools to focus their
energies on substantive law. In this respect, American scholars
were similar to their English counterparts, with whom they
regarded as forming a joint enterprise. Many American law
professors even regarded themselves as teachers of English law,
which they often referred to as “our law”—that “common law”
being the newly rationalized substantive law of contracts, torts,
and property. Langdell’s first casebook, A Selection of Cases on the
Law of Contracts, is dominated by English cases—310 of 336 cases
were from the English courts.165 Langdell was less concerned with
teaching students how courts work than with helping them to
derive and apply the small number of fundamental principles
underpinning private law subjects.166

Id. at 935.
C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1871). I
take the numbers from E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts Scholarship in the Age of the
Anthology, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1406, 1439–40 (1987) (suggesting that cultural
Anglophilia and the desire to present a unified body of doctrine motivated
Langdell’s selection of cases).
166 See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983)
(“Langdell believed that through scientific methods lawyers could derive correct
legal judgments from a few fundamental principles and concepts . . . .”).
164
165
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It would be a mistake to caricature the formalism of the latenineteenth-century Anglo-American elite legal community. Legal
scholars of the period still sometimes relied on policy arguments at
the margins. But taking “formalism” as an ideal type rather than
as a description of any particular scholar, the conclusion remains
sound: the period was a high-point for the idea that legal reasoning
was autonomous from instrumental concerns. Langdell is—
perhaps unfairly167—characterized as an extreme exponent of the
“formalism” of the era, but, in any event, his view of civil
procedure was representative of the growing focus on substantive
law. In fact, in one sense, Langdell viewed civil procedure
instrumentally. As Thomas Grey says, “[a]s a classical legal
scientist [Langdell] regarded procedure as instrumental to the
enforcement of substantive, scientifically ascertained rights;
procedure was thus a kind of technology in the service of legal
science.”168
Thus, procedural rules and doctrines were
instrumental, not to broader social goals, but to substantive legal
rights that were ends in themselves.
As Holmes famously said in a review of Langdell’s contracts
casebook, Langdell elevated “logic” over “experience.”169 But
Holmes, too, was a product of his time, and he exhibited a certain
disdain for procedure, particularly in his earlier work. At the very
beginning of his lectures on the common law, he distinguished
between substance and procedure, identifying the latter with
history and anachronism: “The substance of the law at any given
time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then
understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the
167 Bruce Kimball’s work challenges much of the received wisdom about
Langdell. See, e.g., BRUCE KIMBALL, THE INCEPTION OF MODERN PROFESSIONAL
EDUCATION: C. C. LANGDELL, 1826–1906 (2009); Bruce A. Kimball, Langdell on
Contracts and Legal Reasoning: Correcting the Holmesian Caricature, 25 LAW & HIST.
REV. 345 (2007). The picture that emerges from Kimball’s extensive scholarship is
more nuanced than the picture of Langdell painted by Holmes, Frank, and
Gilmore. According to Kimball, Langdell’s mode of legal reasoning was “three
dimensional, exhibiting a comprehensive yet contradictory integration of
induction from authority, deduction from principle, and analysis of acceptability,
including justice and policy.” Id. at 390. Still, Langdell should plainly be
distinguished from the Legal Realists, for whom “justice and policy” came first
and last.
168 Grey, supra note 166, at 14 n.50.
169 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Review, 14. AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880)
(reviewing C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, WITH
A SUMMARY OF THE TOPICS COVERED BY THE CASES (2d ed. 1879)).
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degree to which it is able to work out desired results, depend very
much upon its past.”170 Holmes’s aim in The Common Law was to
bypass procedure, and to find the substantive principles of torts,
contracts, property, and crimes lurking below the procedural
surface.
Though Langdell followed the general mood in relegating
procedural doctrines to a secondary role, his curriculum did have a
place for civil procedure.171 In this respect, the American law
schools diverged from the English universities. Despite Langdell’s
non-instrumental vision of substantive law, his Harvard Law
School purported to be a professional school training lawyers for
practice. Fittingly, then, the required courses for Harvard law
students, along with the core substantive courses of Contract, Tort,
Property, Equity, and Criminal Law, included a course in Civil
Procedure.172 Langdell, who had substantial practical experience
with the Field Code as a New York lawyer, taught three procedure
courses himself: the required course in “Civil Procedure at
Common Law,”173 and two electives, one in “Civil Procedure
under the New York Code” and the other in “Process, Arrest, and
Bail.” However, perhaps reflecting the general mood, few students
took the elective procedural courses, and the courses were

170 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1–2 (1881); see also id. at
253 (“[W]henever we trace a leading doctrine of substantive law far enough back,
we are very likely to find some forgotten circumstance of procedure at its
source.”).
171 See Bruce A. Kimball, Students’ Choices and Experience During the Transition
to Competitive Academic Achievement at Harvard Law School, 1876–1882, 55 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 163, 172 (2005) (displaying a student’s first-year schedule in 1876, which
included a course in civil procedure taught by Langdell). See also Bruce Kimball &
Pedro Reyes, The “First Modern Civil Procedure Course,” as Taught by C.C. Langdell,
1870–78, 47 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 257, 258 (2005) (noting that the “principles and
characteristics of the ‘modern civil procedure course’ . . . include . . . [a] focus on
the procedural rather than substantive issues of cases”).
172 Langdell seems to have renamed the course “Civil Procedure.”
See
Kimball & Reyes, supra note 171, at 268. Previous courses at Harvard were
entitled “Pleading.” Id.
173 The required class—taught first by Langdell and continued by James Barr
Ames until 1905—was a course in common-law pleading in England under the
forms of action before 1830. This curricular choice is not quite as bizarre as it
might seem. See Kimball & Reyes, supra note 171, at 259 (noting, among other
reasons, that common-law pleading persisted in many American jurisdictions
when Langdell taught).
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discontinued in 1878. More generally, the pleading course was
given “only a minor place in the Langdell curriculum.”174
5.2.3. The Transatlantic Triumph of Substantive Law
To sum up: the nineteenth century witnessed a remarkable
intellectual shift in the way that lawyers in the common-law
tradition organized the law. At the beginning of the nineteenth
century, substance and procedure were almost inseparable.
Scholars and leading lawyers, however, disengaged substantive
law from procedure, and relegated procedure to a subservient role.
The need for procedural reform was an important element of legal
debates in both America and England; to that extent, the
nineteenth century was a century of proceduralism. But the
dominant aim of reformers was to make procedure unimportant, to
approach a utopian state of affairs where procedure no longer
hindered substantive law. American lawyer Thomas Shelton used
various metaphors to explain the subservient role that procedure
ought to play, contending that legal procedure should be “a clean
pipe,” “an unclogged artery, a clear viaduct,” or “a bridge.”175
That sentiment was widely shared by legal scholars throughout the
Anglo-American legal community.
5.3. Procedure’s Revival in Twentieth-Century America
In one respect, however, Langdell provided a foundation for
the later rise of civil procedure. When American law schools
replicated the Harvard curricular model of legal education—
which, in many ways, remains dominant—they also adopted the
course in Pleading or Civil Procedure. Langdell’s curriculum,
then, provided a beachhead for a different kind of American
intellectual interest in the subject. Much like the case method of

174 Carrington, supra note 162, at 321 (stating that “[i]t is as well” Langdell
gave the pleading course “only a minor place in the curriculum” because, at the
time, Ames taught “the rigors” of England’s Hillary Rules, which “proved to be
disastrous in practice and were repealed in 1852”).
175 THOMAS WALL SHELTON, SPIRIT OF THE COURTS 17, 32, 72 (1918), quoted in
Janice Toran, ‘Tis a Gift to Be Simple: Aesthetics and Procedural Reform, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 352, 374–75 (1990) (“Thomas Shelton, who admired Pound, came to share
Pound’s view of procedure. Shelton envisioned a procedure separate from, but
facilitative of, substantive law. He likened procedure to a clean pipe, an
unclogged artery, a clear viaduct, or a bridge.”).
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instruction, the civil procedure course was later used for decidedly
non-Langdellian purposes.
The rising early-twentieth-century Legal Realist mood
prompted civil procedure’s move back from an adjectival position
to a central one in American legal thought. As a multifaceted
movement, Legal Realism was many things, but the Realists shared
at least two positions—one negative, the other constructive. First,
Realists denied a major premise of Langdellian legal science—that
judges could deduce answers from a small number of principles of
substantive law. Second, Realists agreed that law is an instrument
to be used in the service of social ends.176 This functionalism led
the Realists—in their attempts at reconstructive projects—to think
systematically about the consequences of legal rules and practices.
Procedures could not, for the Realists, be simply an instrument
toward the enforcement of substantive law because substantive
law rules were not ends in themselves; to the extent that one could
distinguish between both procedural and substantive law rules,
both kinds should advance social goals. In the end, the Realists
made little progress toward a satisfying account of what those
social goals might be. But in seeking to uncover law’s instrumental
functions, and assessing law’s contribution to them, Realist
scholars were naturally inclined to give serious attention to
procedure as a subject in its own right.177
For these purposes—though not for others—Roscoe Pound
deserves to be classified with the Realists. In his call for a new
kind of legal scholarship, Roscoe Pound asserted that law “must be
judged by the results it achieves, not by the niceties of its internal
structure,”178 and that “[t]he life of the law is in its enforcement.”179
176 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF
LAW ch. 4 (2006). The phrase “law as a means to an end” derives from the work of
the enormously significant nineteenth-century German scholar Rudolf von
Ihering. See RUDOLF VON IHERING, DER ZWECK IM RECHT (1877); RUDOLF VON
IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (Isaac Husik trans., Augustus M. Kelley
Publishers 1968) (1913).
177 There is an element of paradox in the fact that Bentham, the archetypal
instrumentalist, is responsible in large part for the nineteenth-century rise of
substance. The answer to this paradox, I think, is that Bentham was reacting to
the particularly insufferable body of procedural practices that characterized the
late-eighteenth-century common law.
178 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605 (1908)
(“Law is not scientific for the sake of science. Being scientific as a means toward
an end, it must be judged by the results it achieves, not by the niceties of its
internal structure . . . .”).
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Pound, a brilliantly insightful observer of trends in legal thought,
diagnosed the new hegemony of substantive law categories in the
minds of American legal scholars.180 Unsurprisingly, given his
commitment to understanding the social effects of legal rules and
institutions, Pound decried this trend, and called for scholars to
pay more attention to procedure. As Jay Tidmarsh has shown,
Pound “understood that procedure was about something
important. It was a critical dimension of his larger theory of law,
and was a central component of his program for systematic legal
reform.”181 In a famous speech to the American Bar Association,182
Pound reignited the movement for procedural reform,183 which
eventually culminated in the promulgation of the new Federal
Rules three decades later.
In this respect, Pound’s intellectual commitment to civil
procedure unites him with later, unambiguous members of the
Legal Realist “movement.” Karl Llewellyn named as one of the
movement’s emergent achievements that “[s]tudy has been
attempted of ‘substantive rules’ in the particular light of the
available remedial procedure.”184 “Everything that you know of
procedure,” Karl Llewellyn advised beginning law students, “you
must carry into every substantive course. You must read each
substantive course, so to speak, through the spectacles of that
procedure. For what substantive law says should be means
nothing except in terms of what procedure says that you can make
real.”185

Id. at 619 (“The life of the law is in its enforcement.”).
Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 514 (1912) (claiming that the “study of the means of making legal rules
effective . . . has been neglected almost entirely in the past”).
181 Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 574
(2006).
182 Roscoe Pound, THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, 29 REP. A.B.A. 395 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273
(1964).
183 See Carrington, supra note 162, 321–27. As Carrington suggests, “[t]he
teaching of civil procedure received a powerful impulse from the Progressive
era.” Id. at 321.
184 Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound,
44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1244 (1930).
185 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 17-18
(1951).
179
180
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Like Pound, the Legal Realists characteristically viewed law as
achieving social ends or solving social problems.
On this
conception of the function of law, legal scholars would need to
think systematically about procedure to assess the law’s actual
contributions to those ends, or solving those problems. The more
radical forms of Realism—in particular, Jerome Frank’s skepticism
about the very process of fact-finding186—challenged head-on the
basic assumption that procedure could possibly be the servant of
substantive law.
The arch-Realist Thurman Arnold, in his 1932 article The Role of
Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal Process, made explicit the
way Realists thought about procedure.187 Arnold’s article is
probably the clearest attack on the Langdellian legal academy’s
privileging of substance over procedure. By that time, Arnold
could refer to “our modern skepticism about substantive law”188—
the possessive here referring to Legal Realists—even though the
idea of substantive law was itself of recent vintage. Arnold
recognized that judges, in order to maintain their power, were
obligated to “talk of substantive law as a scientific body of
principles which govern society.”189 He argued that a “shift of
emphasis from doctrines to courts needs to be made if we are
either to understand, reform, or restate any part of our judicial
system.”190
Arnold identified fundamental differences between the ways
that the preceding generation of scholars and lawyers had thought
about substantive law, on the one hand, and procedure, on the
other. Substantive law, for Langdell and those who shared his
assumptions, was “sacred and fundamental”; procedure was
simply a matter of detail.191 Substantive law, on the view Arnold
criticized, might be “restated,” but it never needed reform because
JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
See Arnold, supra note 12.
188 Id. at 618.
189 Id. (claiming that the construction of a “science of substantive law” was a
method for avoiding the implication that judicial decisions were grounded in
personal and arbitrary elements, and for maintaining the power and prestige of an
independent judiciary).
190 Id. at 619.
191 Id. at 643 (discussing how substantive law and procedural law are treated
differently, even though one could label some laws as either substantive law or as
procedural).
186
187
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“its fundamental verities can always be discovered by logical
analysis.”192 By contrast, on the orthodox view, procedural reform
could be accomplished by looking to the “problem involved.” But
for Arnold, the substance-procedure distinction was only a matter
of attitude, and entirely manipulable.
“Substantive law is
canonized procedure. Procedure is unfrocked substantive law.”193
Arnold called on his fellow Realists to recast substantive legal rules
as procedural problems to support the effort to reform them.
Tellingly for the purposes of this Article, Arnold chose the
work of Arthur Goodhart—a New Yorker in origin but a decidedly
English legal scholar—as an exemplar of those who divided
substantive law and procedure into fundamentally different
categories.194
Goodhart approached “substantive law”—such
notions as contracts and torts—in a manner completely different
from procedural questions like the assessment of attorney’s fees
under the “loser pays” rule. On Goodhart’s account, substantive
law was fundamental, part of the “science of law.”195 The
assessment of attorney’s fees, by contrast, was “treated [by
Goodhart] as a practical problem to which no methodology of the
discovery of principles scientifically arrived at is necessary.”196
Arnold’s efforts to problematize the procedure-substance
distinction were in the service of grand goals: to depart from
traditional “formalist” ways of thought and convince judges to
tolerate the New Deal’s coming embrace of bureaucratic forms of
governance. Other Realists explored the fluid substance-procedure
boundary in more conventional doctrinal terms. One obvious
context was the conflict of laws, a staple law school course in
Id. at 643.
Id. at 645.
194 After an undergraduate degree at Yale, Goodhart studied law at
Cambridge University, and then “spent nearly all his working life” in Britain. See
Tony Honoré, Goodhart, Arthur Lehman, in OXFORD DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL
BIOGRAPHY (rev. 2004) (chronicling Goodhart’s legal studies and relationship with
Cambridge University).
195 For Goodhart’s views on substantive law, Arnold refers to Arthur L.
Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930),
reprinted in ARTHUR L. GOODHART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COMMON LAW
(1931).
196 Arnold, supra note 12 at 635 (differentiating between applying rules with
attitude induced by the science of law and applying rules with the attitude of an
administrative official). Here, Arnold appears to be referring to Arthur L.
Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929), reprinted in GOODHART, ESSAYS, supra note
195.
192
193
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multi-jurisdictional America. An axiom of the field as developed
by “vested rights” theorists like Joseph Beale was that the forum
should apply its own procedural rules, leaving substantive law as
the domain for conflicts doctrine.197 But the courts drew criticism
from formalist scholars for their lack of consistency in
distinguishing between rules of substantive law and procedural
rules.198 A particular rule—a rule allocating the burden of proof, a
limitations period, a rule for calculating damages—might be
deemed substantive in one doctrinal context yet procedural in
another.
Writing the year after Arnold, Walter Wheeler Cook set his
sights on the “the tacit assumption that the supposed ‘line’
between the two categories [of ‘substantive law’ and ‘procedural’
law] has some kind of objective existence.”199 In a characteristic
Realist move, Cook contended that the boundary between
substance and procedure varied legitimately depending on the
purpose for which the courts were drawing the distinction.
Identifying eight such purposes,200 Cook invited lawyers to
abandon the forlorn search for a single conceptual truth about the
procedure-substance distinction, and instead examine the different
value judgments at stake in each instance.
By the time Erie brought the substance-procedure distinction to
prominence, then, American lawyers were already beginning to
develop a more mature understanding of procedural questions. In
the same year that the Supreme Court decided Erie, the new
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ushered in a new era, finally
reforming the federal courts, freeing them from many ancient
technicalities. The primary drafter of the Federal Rules was
Charles E. Clark, a self-identified Legal Realist.201 The flexible,

197 See, e.g., HERBERT FUNK GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 159 (1927) (“Matters
of remedy, or procedure, then, are determined by the law of the forum. The
general statement is not disputed; the difficulty comes in determining, on a
concrete set of facts, into which class the case involved falls.”).
198 See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATION AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS (2d ed. 1995).
199 Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws,
42 YALE L.J. 333, 335–36 (1933) (describing difficulties with determining which side
of the line many rules fall).
200 Id. at 341–43.
201 See Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal
Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 80
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discretionary approach the drafters brought to procedural design
rested on Realist premises. Under Clark’s philosophy, procedural
rules were instruments for achieving social functions.202 As David
Marcus has recently argued, “[m]any of the Federal Rules, as well
as the procedural architecture they provide civil litigation, quite
neatly match the sort of reforms Clark championed in a corpus of
scholarship that outlined a realist vision for procedure.”203
Procedural rules, for Clark, were the handmaid of justice,204 not the
handmaid of a body of black-letter substantive law.
Legal Realism transformed American legal thought, even for
those who purported to reject it. The post-war Legal Process
school was in part a response to Legal Realism, but it also accepted
a key Realist tenet: the importance of procedure.205
“[P]roceduralism became the favored response to what some
considered the ‘nihilism’ of legal realism.”206 Legal Process
scholars sought to divert attention from substantive rules to the
allocation of decision-making power; among Hart and Sacks’ key
tenets was that procedural understandings, including the
allocations of decision-making authority, were “more fundamental
than . . . substantive arrangements.”207 For Legal Process theorists,

(1989) (“[Clark was] perhaps the single most important figure in the drafting of
the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
202 David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Legal Realism as a
Jurisprudence of Law Reform, 44 GA. L. REV. 433 (2010) (analyzing the influence of
Legal Realism on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and in particular the work
of Charles E. Clark).
203 Id. at 441 (noting Clark’s belief in harmony between Realist jurisprudence
and the Federal Rules’ procedural reforms).
204 Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297 (1938). The
title of the article derives from the statement of a senior English judge, who said
that “the relation of rules of practice to the work of justice is intended to be that of
handmaid rather than mistress.” Re Coles and Ravenshear, [1907] 1 K.B. 1, 4
(Collins, M.R.).
205 See Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American
Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601 (1993) (stressing continuities between Legal
Realism and Legal Process thought).
206 Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy
Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 170–71 (2006) (noting that both
proceduralism and legal realism raise controversial questions of morality and
policy).
207 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart
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“[t]he study of procedure is central to understanding law, because
rational procedures facilitate the ability of positive law to be
implemented in a way consistent with reason and natural law.”208
Hart and Wechsler, who designed the Federal Courts class that
continues to draw the most ambitious law students, were
archetypal Legal Process thinkers.
In her recent article on the United States Supreme Court’s
response to “war-on-terror” litigation, Jenny Martinez has stressed
the importance of Legal Process thought to contemporary
American legal culture. As Martinez notes, in the American legal
academy—more than elsewhere—“there is enduring (and not
entirely unwarranted) appeal in the promise that if we can just
figure out a good process for making decisions, the hard policy
questions of the time will be resolved correctly.”209 I would add,
however, that the roots of Legal Process lay in the Legal Realist
challenge to the autonomy of legal reasoning about substantive
rights and duties.210 But it is not just that Legal Realism provoked
Legal Process; Legal Realists themselves were proceduralists, at
least in the broad sense of the word as I have used it. As more
conservative elements in the legal academy adopted procedural
responses to a movement that demanded attention to procedure,
the importance of procedure to America became firmly
entrenched.211

and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 964 (1994) (“[Q]uestions of how
decision-making authority should be allocated are of foremost importance.”).
208 Eskridge, supra note 53, at 964 (identifying the importance of rational
procedure as the focus of the Hart and Sacks tradition).
209 Martinez, supra note 2, at 1064.
210 See, e.g., TAMANAHA, supra note 176, at 102–07; Fallon, supra note 207, at
970 (“[Legal Process methodology] substantially addressed the threat of judicial
subjectivity introduced by Legal Realism, but without relying on the metaphysical
pretenses that had brought moral and political philosophy into bad repute.”).
211 My linking of proceduralism and Realism may strike some readers as
paradoxical: aren’t “proceduralism” and “realism” opposed to one another? See
Balkin & Levinson, supra note 206, at 169–72 (“Realism and proceduralism are the
two great legacies bequeathed by American jurisprudence, and each responds to
the other in a great spiraling dialectic.”). The two are opposed only if one defines
proceduralism more narrowly than I do in this Article. In the broader sense of
proceduralism used here, one can easily be a proceduralist and a realist
simultaneously.
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While Legal-Process-style ideas continue to exert a fairly strong
influence in American legal academia,212 it would be a mistake to
conclude any sketch of the intellectual history of American
procedural thought with the state of affairs in the 1950s.
Subsequent developments confirm both the significance of
procedural thinking and the influence of Legal Realism. I will limit
the story to what, for these specific purposes, seem to me the most
important “sects” of American legal theory:213 the law-andeconomics movement, and the “metaproceduralism” emanating
from Yale Law School in the 1970s.
Lawyer-economists generally take procedure quite seriously, in
their own way. This, I suggest, follows from the fact that law-andeconomics is—despite Judge Posner’s protestations214—a
descendant of the instrumentalist strain in Legal Realist thinking.
Here is an example from the early days of economic analysis of
law: Guido Calabresi’s efficiency calculus for the costs of accidents
included “tertiary costs”—the costs of administering different
accident systems.215 An otherwise inferior accident system might
be better from the point of view of overall efficiency once one
212 See Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory Of Adjudication and The False
Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution And Public Law Models Of Litigation, 75 B.U. L.
REV. 1273 (1995) (studying the influence of American procedure on academia and
public policy). In addition to Legal Process’s continued influence in the civil
procedure and federal court fields, much influential public law scholarship
continues to be shaped by arguments of institutional competence, as exemplified
in the work of scholars such as Cass Sunstein, William Eskridge, Richard Fallon,
and Adrian Vermeule. For a longer list of “New Legal Process” scholars in public
law, see Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1424 n.2 (2011).
213 Duncan Kennedy explains that legal theory became “sectarianized” in the
second half of the twentieth century. See Duncan Kennedy, The Disenchantment of
Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max Weber’s Sociology in the Genealogy of the
Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1032 (2004)
(describing Critical Legal Studies as “one of the sects of modern legal theory”).
214 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 3 (1995) (“The law and
economics movement owes little to legal realism . . . .”). Brian Leiter provides a
more convincing account of the relationship between Legal Realism and economic
analysis of law. See Brian Leiter, In Praise of Realism (and Against “Nonsense”
Jurisprudence), 100 GEO. L.J. 865, 871–75 (2012) (“Whatever the chain of influence, it
seems clear that economic analysis of law, like Legal Realism, is predicated on a
thoroughgoing skepticism about the adequacy of existing legal categories and the
need for an alternative explanation of the actual course of decisions.”).
215 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 28 (1970) (considering the economic and legal costs involved in accident
law and procedure).
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considers the cost of administering the alternatives. So a strict
liability rule could be preferable to a negligence liability rule, even
if the strict liability rule would otherwise be less likely to induce
efficient behavior, because (arguably) a strict liability rule is easier
and cheaper for courts to administer.216 Economists distinguish
between the error costs of legal procedure (costs resulting from the
erroneous decision of a sanction) and the actual costs of litigating
disputes.217 Moreover, the fact that bringing a lawsuit is costly to
plaintiffs affects their incentives to bring suit, and must therefore
be incorporated into any analysis of the deterrent effect of the
proposed legal rule—and so on. Lawyer-economists, it is true,
have tended to focus heavily on the costs of legal procedures,218
while perhaps underestimating their benefits.219 All the same,
there is a world of difference betwen law-and-economics
approaches and the nineteenth-century canonization of substantive
law. To restate the point: lawyer-economists must attend to
procedural realities if they are to remain true to their
consequentialist foundations.
“Metaproceduralists,” of course, give the study of procedure
pride of place. They, too, derive inspiration from Legal-Realist

216 The literature on the choice of strict liability versus negligence liability
rules is large, and much of it addresses administrative costs. On the issue
mentioned in the text, aggregate administrative costs could in fact be higher under
strict liability if it results in a higher volume of cases than under a fault-based
regime. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Rawlsian Fairness and Regime Choice in the
Law of Accidents, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1857, 1916 (2004) (“Strict liability is probably
more expensive to administer than negligence because strict liability requires
cranking up the liability system for nonnegligent accidents as well as for negligent
ones, with all the administrative costs that this entails.”).
217 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 399 (1973) (arguing from an economic
perspective “that the processes of legal dispute resolution in America are
dangerously overloaded”).
218 The tendency to stress the costs of legal adjudication is particularly
pronounced in scholarship stressing the relative efficiency of social (rather than
legal) norms. On the rise of “social norms” in the economic analysis of law, see
Robert C. Ellickson, Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STUD.
537 (1998). See also ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).
219 For a powerful argument that economic analyses of tort law fail
sufficiently to consider the collateral consequences of legal procedures, see Scott
Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 STAN. L. REV. 67, 68
(2010) (making the same charge against corrective justice accounts of tort law).
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premises,220 with a greater emphasis on the skeptical aspects of
Realist thought. The Cover-Fiss-Resnik casebook, an emblem of
metaproceduralism,221 is full of doubts about the capacity for
existing legal procedures to produce the right answers to social
and legal problems. The authors diverged on the implications of
Realist skepticism and functionalism.222 Robert Cover doubted the
ability of courts to advance the good life. Owen Fiss has more faith
in the ability of legal procedures—in the hands of the right
judges—to identify, advance, and enforce public values; Judith
Resnik is more ambivalent about the power and possibilities of
judicial processes. What all share, however, is a fierce intellectual
engagement with questions of procedure.
5.4. The Continued Dominance of Substantive Law in England
English law, by contrast, has never had a Realist revolution.
“[W]hile the instrumentalist revolution in legal thought was taking
place across the Atlantic, English legal theory hardly moved at
all.”223 This part of the story is necessarily short—there was no
fundamental change in the character of English legal thought, and
no significant advances for procedure from the secondary position
to which it was relegated at the end of the nineteenth century. I
suggest a link between these two non-events; the continued
“formalism” of English legal thought accounts, in large part, for
the continued focus on substantive law to the exclusion of
procedure.
The emergence of American Legal Realism marks the point of
departure. Arnold’s article on substance and procedure contains a
220 See Mullenix, supra note 80, at 1140 (stating that the Cover-Fiss-Resnik
casebook, PROCEDURE, supra note 53, was “distantly rooted in Dean Roscoe
Pound’s sociological jurisprudence and the Realist movement of the 1920s and
1930s”).
221 Id.
222 See Eskridge, supra note 53, at 962–73 (“Unlike traditional theory,
normativism is pessimistic that just results will necessarily flow from good
procedures, and understands that justice involves a broader social transformation,
perhaps of the sort where state activity is not appropriate (Cover) or sufficient
(Fisk and Resnik).”). Cover, Fiss, and Resnik are, of course, proceduralists under
my definition. Note that Eskridge defines “proceduralism” more narrowly as the
“the notion that good procedures are presumptive evidence of good results.” Id.
at 964. See Section 2, supra.
223 ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 89, at 257; see generally RICHARD A. POSNER,
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1996).
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fascinating insight into the difference between England and
America as the Legal Realist movement took hold in America.
Casting his eye across the Atlantic to the English legal system,
Arnold saw “no skeptics undermining its prestige.”224 Indeed,
American lawyers of the time seemed unanimous in heralding the
superiority of English judges over their American cousins. For
Arnold, this was not because the English judges were actually
superior, but because English judges had created and maintained a
purer body of substantive law. Arnold contended that, since the
Judicature Acts, English judges had “insulat[ed] . . . the science of
substantive law from the practical problem of litigation.”225
Arnold argued that the English judges had maintained the
appearance of a pristine domain of substantive law by excluding
procedural questions from that domain. English law referred
many procedural matters to a master, thereby removing them from
the science of law as administered by judges. Moreover, the “loserpays” rule reduced the number of appellate decisions by
discouraging appeals. And only a small number of decisions were
selected for inclusion in the law reports, thereby protecting English
law from inconvenient decisions that might threaten its logical
coherence. The prestige of English judges rested on their ability
“to keep an ideal from too close contact with reality.”226
English legal thought was remarkably indifferent to the work
of the Legal Realists, and instrumental legal theory made relatively
little ground in the twentieth-century legal academy. Again, it is
important to avoid stereotypes when discussing an entire legal
culture. English legal scholarship is not entirely devoid of
instrumentalism or other critical perspectives on law. A minority
of legal scholars engage in economic analysis, critical legal studies,
or literary theory. But English legal scholars are decidedly not “all
realists now.”227 Writing in 1996, American legal scholar Robert
Arnold, supra note 187, at 637.
Id. at 638.
226 Id. at 640.
227 Cf. Yishai Blank, The Reenchantment of Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 633, 640 n.50
(2011) (noting “the famous, almost cliché saying, ‘we are all realists now.’”). The
earliest instance of the saying that I have found is in a review of Llewellyn’s book
on appellate decision-making. See Beryl Harold Levy, Book Review, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 1045, 1047 (1961) (reviewing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960)) (“we are all Realists now, my friend
Gellhorn insists, and if it is so, let us bow and bow low to our author”).
224
225
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Gordon noted that “[o]ur most distinctive legal-intellectual
achievement, legal realism, is classified in British jurisprudence
texts as an odd minor school of chaps who rather curiously
supposed law was just what judges do, and do according to
passing psychological whims, political fancies, or hunches.”228 As
a general matter, scholarly work in England remains committed to
an internal perspective on legal doctrine.229 That is particularly
true in the fields of law to which civil procedure is considered
“handmaid”—essentially, private law and administrative law.
The failure of legal instrumentalism to take hold is illustrated
partly by the the relative rule-formalism of the English lawyer. To
a greater extent than Americans, English legal scholars in the
twentieth century believed, and still believe, that most of what
judges do is to simply apply settled law to facts. The sophisticated
English lawyer will accept that in relatively rare cases the law runs
out and so the judge is required to fill the gap and make new law.
H.L.A. Hart expressed the typically English view that American
legal theory oscillated betweeen the “noble dream” of believing
that judges had no discretion (Dworkinian or, now, originalist
constitutional theories) and the “nightmare” of extreme Legal
Realism.230 To American observers, the English take their judges
too seriously, and seem naive about the real forces that determine
the outcomes of cases.
We need not adjudicate between these contrasting views on the
forces that actually shape judicial decisions; nor need we
investigate how much actual differences between American judges
and English judges account for these differing pictures of
adjudication. Our focus here is on the distinction between
228 See Robert W. Gordon, American Law Through English Eyes: A Century of
Nightmares and Noble Dreams, 84 GEO. L.J. 2215, 2215 (1996) (reviewing NEIL
DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1995)). For an account of the
post-Realist divergence in Anglo-American legal history scholarship, see Michael
Lobban, The Varieties of Legal History, 5 CLIO@THÉMIS 11 (2012).
229 See Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in
Legal Thought: American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 HASTINGS
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 295 (2008) (“[In England] as a whole, scholarly work based
upon black-letter law continues to predominate as it does on the European
continent.”); Neil Duxbury, When Trying is Failing: Holmes’s “Englishness,” 63
BROOK. L. REV. 145, 146 (1997) (explaining the “different academic personae” of
American and English law professors); ATIYAH, PRAGMATISM, supra note 89, at 166
(noting the “general aversion to theory” across the English legal system).
230 H.L.A. Hart, The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969 (1977),
reprinted in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 123–44 (1983).
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instrumental visions of law and perspectives that, instead, view
law as an autonomous discipline. The English rejection of the idea
that law should be analyzed in terms of the instrumental goals it
serves is particularly pronounced in the field of private law. The
parallels between the legal thought of Langdell and Peter Birks, the
most influential private law scholar of recent years, are striking.231
For a surprising number of scholars—particularly at the elite
university law schools—the only consideration relevant to a judge
resolving a private law dispute is the need to provide corrective
justice between the parties to the lawsuit. Questions of “policy”
are quite simply irrelevant: “the class of arguments which a judge
can use to resolve a case are restricted and exclude public policy
concerns.”232 To the extent that English scholars of private law
seek an interdisciplinary perspective on law, they often look to the
least instrumentally-inclined source imaginable—Kantian moral
philosophy. Legal scholars who adhere to a backward-looking, bipolar model of legal disputes naturally profess little interest in
understanding the effect of legal rules on ex ante incentives. They
will be relatively unconcerned with the aggregate effects of legal
rules across a broad range of cases. And they will understandably
be less interested in procedure—the body of rules, doctrines, and
practices that translates substantive law into reality.
I have suggested that instrumental legal thought leads one to
give greater prominence to procedure, but the causation may also
run in the other direction, in a kind of vicious—or virtuous—circle.
Studying procedure exposes one to the practical imperfections of
the legal system, to how the realities of practical application fall
short of the ideal. In the United States, students and scholars are
comfortable with the idea that the outcome of a case depends on
231 For a perceptive account of Birksian English private law scholarship from
an American perspective, see generally Chaim Saiman, Restitution in America: Why
the U.S. Refuses to Join the Global Restitution Party, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 99
(2008). Saiman contends elsewhere that “Birks, a leading figure of AngloContinental private law thought in the late-twentieth century, would have had
difficulty securing tenure at even a third-tier American law school.” Chaim
Saiman, Public Law, Private, and Legal Science, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 691, 696 (2008).
232 See, e.g., ROBERT STEVENS, TORT AND RIGHTS 308 (2007). Perhaps the most
extreme statement of the anti-instrumental viewpoint in the AngloCommonwealth world is Allan Beever & Charles Rickett, Interpretive Legal Theory
and the Academic Lawyer, 68 MOD. L. REV. 320, 328 (2005) (“Interpretive legal theory
is nothing more (nor less) than the attempt to understand legal concepts in terms
of their meaning.”). For Beever and Rickett, legal scholarship that explains legal
concepts in policy terms is simply not legal scholarship. Id. at 335–37.
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the identity of the decision-maker. Avoiding procedural questions
allows English scholars of substantive law to push these
troublesome questions to one side. In addition, the institutional
structure of English legal education helps to keep civil procedure
off the map for legal scholars; the professions maintain control
over “vocational” training, removing the need for university law
schools to teach procedural subjects.233
English legal scholars, in keeping with their more formal vision
of law, continue to see procedure simply as the “handmaid” of
substantive law.234
On this view, the fundamental aim of
procedure is, to the extent consistent with other goals, to apply the
law to the facts and produce the correct result dictated. Even
England’s most urbane civil procedure scholar, Adrian
Zuckerman, whose work shows deep familiarity with American
procedural scholarship, feels able to conceptualize the relationship
between procedure and substantive law in fairly straightforward
terms:
Law enforcement in the context of civil litigation means
deciding cases by establishing the true facts and correctly
applying the law to them. Put differently, the court must
give the parties what is due to them under the law. In a
system governed by the rule of law, the law maker lays
down the law and the court applies it.235
American legal scholars necessarily exhibit more complex
views about the relationship between procedure and substance.
Post-Realist American theorists have attended to procedural justice
as a distinct form of justice,236 the site of its own distinct conflicts
See supra notes 89–94 and accompanying text.
ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 89, at 186 (“In the more formal vision of
law it is simply taken for granted that, other things being equal, the more
compliance there is with the dictates of formal legal reasoning, the better.”).
235 Adrian Zuckerman, The Challenge of Civil Justice Reform: Effective Court
Management of Litigation, 1 CITY U. H.K. L. REV. 49, 53 (2009). I do not mean to
suggest that Zuckerman’s own views of the nature of civil procedure are
undeveloped. For example, Zuckerman explains that the extent to which the legal
system should pursue its fundamental objective—getting at the truth—is
constrained by the limitations of expense and the need to render a speedy
decision. Id. at 54–55.
236 See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 183 (2004)
(“[P]rocedural justice is deeply entwined with the old and powerful idea that a
process that guarantees rights of meaningful participation is an essential
prerequisite for the legitimate authority of action-guiding legal norms.”).
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and special choices, rather than as (just) an instrument for the
enforcement of substantive law. As an illustration of the degree to
which Americans intellectualize procedure, Jenny Martinez
outlines five distinct ways that procedure and substance
interrelate.237 Another, in an echo of Thurman Arnold, contends
that “procedure is substantive, and that substance is
procedural.”238 At the level of legal theory, as well as in the
curriculum, a stark difference persists between England and
America.
A narrowing of the divergence is far from inconceivable. To
some extent, the vision of English legal scholarship I have may
already be outdated; the English legal academy has been
undergoing rapid change, and “black-letter” scholarship on
matters of substantive law appears to be declining in prestige. In
addition to this trend towards wider perspectives on law,
institutional and political change may in the future drive English
legal scholars to think more about procedure. England may “do
more” with private litigation, particularly if European plans to
develop harmonized rules for collective redress—a European form
of class action—come to fruition.239 If procedure is important
mainly because of how it allocates power among different actors in
the civil justice system, then European integration (if the United
Kingdom participates in it) is likely to increase procedure’s cultural
prominence. The process of European integration has already had
a radical effect on procedure in public law; the ultimate content of
fundamental rights is now set, at least formally, by a court outside
the English system—the European Court of Human Rights. The
development of federalism within the European Union is likely to
have an even more disruptive effect on the traditionally unitary
English civil justice system.
But systematic thinking about civil procedure is unlikely to
become widespread until curricular changes allow a critical mass
of English legal scholars to make it their daily business to write
about procedural questions and teach them to the next generations
of lawyers. The structure of legal education in England may serve
as an agent of path-dependence; for civil procedure to gain
Martinez, supra note 2, at 1031.
Main, supra note 27.
239 See generally Duncan Fairgrieve & Geraint Howells, Collective Redress
Procedures—European Debates, 58 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 379 (2009).
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prominence in England—a prominence the subject surely
deserves—England will need a change in university legal
education. I suggest, however, that such change is unlikely, unless
we see a deeper change in the way English scholars think about the
law.
6.

CONCLUSION

The comparative example of England illuminates American
proceduralism in civil justice and beyond. During their training,
American lawyers learn that procedure is just as worthy of
intellectual attention as substantive law. Their English equivalents
learn the opposite lesson; for them, civil procedure is a body of
technical rules, not fit for scholarly reflection. To some extent,
structural differences in the respective legal systems account for
this cultural disparity. More than England, America uses civil
litigation as an engine of regulation. Procedure necessarily plays a
more important role in America because it allocates power to the
many authorities among whom it is divided. But the divergence
between these two common-law countries is even more
fundamental than that. The cultural prominence of civil procedure
reflects a distinctly American urge to transcend the conceptual
structure of substantive legal doctrine, to understand the purposes
and effects of law and legal institutions. If consequences matter, so
does procedure.
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